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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Objective 
 
Quantification of uncertainty is a key requirement for the design of a nuclear 
power plant and the assurance of its safety.  Historically the procedure has been to 
perform the required uncertainty assessment through comparison of the analytical 
predictions with experimental simulations.  The issue with this historical approach has 
always been that the simulations through experiments could not be at full scale for the 
practical reasons of cost and scheduling.  Invariably, only parts of the system were tested 
separately or if integral testing was performed for the complete system, the size or scale 
of the experimental apparatus was significantly smaller than the actual plant 
configuration.   
 
In the U.S. and in the rest of the world, selection of facility scaling was a large 
topic during the resolution of the ECCS issue for the current fleet of GEN II LWRs in the 
1980s.  Whether or not the experimental data which was produced by and phenomena 
which occurred during the tests performed in each facility were representative of those 
which would actually occur in the operating plants, which typically are of much large 
size scale, was a subject of much discussion.  As a consequence of this effort on LWR 
ECCS performance and best-estimate code predictions, the USNRC developed a 
systematic methodology termed Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty (CSAU) 
methodology, which was to resolve the question of the appropriateness of utilizing 
scaled-down test facilities to provide the data to assess the uncertainty in the predictions 
of the best-estimate design and safety tools.  Unquestionably, code applicability and the 
uncertainty evaluation are of equal importance with the issue of scaling. The CSAU 
methodology therefore is comprised of a number of steps which are summarized here. 
 1. Specification of the transient scenario and the selection of plant for which 
the uncertainty assessment is to be performed. 
2.  Identification of the phenomena which occur during the transient scenario 
and the ranking of the importance of the phenomena with respect to the 
primary safety criteria.  The Phenomena Identification and Ranking Tables 
(PIRTs) are the product of this step. 
3. Determination of the code applicability for the analysis of the selected 
scenario by relating the modeling in the code to the modeling 
requirements specified in the PIRTs. 
4. Assessment of the parameter predictions by establishing an assessment 
matrix of test cases consistent with the finding of the PIRTs, determining 
the effect of scale and carrying out the comparison of the data from the 
tests cases with the results from calculations performed with the applicable 
codes selected in Step (3).  This produces the uncertainty assessments of 
the tools which is the goal of this CSAU process.   
 
These steps can be further detailed but in the main, the major points have been 
outlined here.  The objective of the work in this GEN IV VHTR task is to support the 
VHTR Design Methods Development and Validation R&D program plan by focusing on 
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steps (1) and (2) of the CSAU methodology.  This would prepare the basis for step (4) 
where the actual validation calculations with the selected codes are performed and the 
standard problem/experiments for the assessment are planned and carried out.   
 
Delineation of plant accidents, transient scenarios and steady state conditions is 
essential to defining the modeling needs for the design and safety tools required for 
designing the various reactor and plant components and evaluating the safety case.  This 
is Step (1) of the CSAU methodology.  Once a duty cycle range has been established, 
then the phenomena which occur during these scenarios for the different conditions can 
be identified.  Identification of the phenomena will enable the determination of the 
models necessary to be implemented in the design and safety tools.  This is Step (2) of 
the CSAU methodology.  Prioritization of these modeling needs will allow a systematic 
R&D program planning approach to the development of the tools and the construction of 
the accompanying experiments.   The tools could take the form of 1-D integrated system 
analysis codes or 3-D Computational Fluid Dynamics codes.  It is anticipated that with 
the continuation of the VHTR/NGNP project into the licensing stage, the work performed 
here would form the starting basis for the interaction with the NRC licensing process. 
 
This report documents the work performed in FY06 on steps (1) and (2).  Chapter 
2 provides a description of the generic Pebble Bed Reactor (PBR) and Prismatic Modular 
Reactor (PMR) designs which were used in this study.  The selection of accident 
sequences for the generation of the PIRTs is discussed in Chapter 3.  The appropriate 
PIRTs are presented in Chapter 4.  The sensitivity calculations which were performed to 
provide input for the prioritizing of the phenomena in the PIRTs are presented in Chapter 
5.  Conclusions regarding specific model development needs based on the PIRTs and the 
sensitivity calculations are documented in Chapter 6.  The focus is on core flow 
distribution modeling.  
 
1.2 Scope  
 
The GIF VHTR Computational Methods Validation and Benchmark (CMV) 
Project Management Board (PMB) is composed of members from all the international 
partners participating in the GIF VHTR System Research Plan.  This PMB is 
collaborating on coordination of the international effort in this area.  Board discussions 
are underway on assuming the role of the Standards Problem Committee for the VHTR 
CFD tools.  PMB participants could therefore have the responsibility of selecting the set 
of standard problems/experiments that form the assessment matrix of test cases for the 
assessment and validation of the tools that will eventually comprise the VHTR design 
and safety analysis methodology.  Furthermore, the VHTR/CMV PMB has decided to 
review the PIRTs documented by this GEN IV task and its I-NERI companion project 
with KAERI as a starting step in the international collaboration on the validation of the 
selected tools.  Both the U.S. program and the international program are proceeding, and 
it may well be that the US VHTR (NGNP) could have elements of an international 
design.  As elements of a design are required to define the envelope of experiments to be 
performed and models which need to be developed, the scope of the work documented in 
this report was defined to be broad enough to also include these potential designs. 
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Since a specific design has not yet been selected for the choice of the US VHTR 
(NGNP), it was decided early on to focus on a generic plant and reactor design with 
broadly typical features for Step (1) of the CSAU from both US and International efforts.   
Both a generic Pebble Bed Reactor (PBR) design and a generic Prismatic Modular 
Reactor (PMR) design were selected.  The generic PBR design selected is a version of the 
400 MWt South African PBMR design.  The generic PMR design selected is a version of 
the 600 MWt GT-MHR.  Chapter 2 provides a summary description of these two reactor 
plant design types, and some details are given for some of the more relevant features.  
These are based on what is available in the open literature and were selected after a 
literature survey was performed.  No proprietary information was made available to the 
work.  The PIRTs that have been generated and documented in this report for the selected 
transient scenario (event) have been based on these generic designs.  Since the PIRTs are 
at this stage also high-level “generic” PIRTs, this approach should be a consistent one.  
Where differences between the two designs have affected the PIRTs, these have been 
duly noted.  However it should also be noted, that it has been assumed in this report that 
the Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) for the PBR is an air-cooled one and not the 
water cooled version.  Also of significance, it should be recognized that the indirect cycle 
PMR design has been designated for later consideration as only the direct cycle option 
has been considered here for both the PMR and the PBR transient scenarios of interest.  
Prioritization of modeling needs for the thermal-fluid design and safety analysis tools 
based on these generic design assumptions should be appropriate for this stage of the 
VHTR R&D plan.   
 
1.3 Background 
 
In the previous year’s work, the transient scenarios selected for the PIRT exercise 
included the two that are considered to be among the most limiting for the safety criteria 
and are generally considered to be well beyond the off-normal spectrum of events and 
into the Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA) space.  These are the High Pressure 
Conduction Cooling (HPCC) and the Low Pressure Conduction Cooling (LPCC) 
scenarios.  An event sequence that would lead to the HPCC transient scenario is the 
station blackout with scram event.  This is where loss of all electric power occurs but the 
reactor trips and scram rods are inserted to shutdown the critical nuclear reaction.  
Similarly, the same sequence type of the blackout but accompanied by a leak or break 
would lead to LPCC.  Core conduction cooling by radiation to the vessel and beyond is 
the means of decay heat removal for both transient scenarios.  The Reactor Cavity 
Cooling Systems (RCCS) is the ultimate passive heat sink system for this decay heat 
removal.  The HPCC and LPCC are essentially decay heat removal accidents.  In addition 
to the LPCC and HPCC, a Load Change (LC) event was also included as an example of a 
normal operational transient that should be considered as part of the plant duty cycle and 
should be part of the capability of the analysis tools.  PIRTs were generated in FY05 for 
these three transient scenarios and were documented in [1.1].  The collaboration between 
ANL, INL and KAERI on the companion I-NERI project #2004-001-K “Screening of 
Gas-Cooled Reactor Thermal-Hydraulic and Safety Analysis Tools and Experiment 
Database” was in part focused also on the generation of consensus high-level PIRTs for 
these three events.  The results reported in [1.1] and the companion I-NERI effort 
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provided the basis for the consensus PIRTs between the three participating organizations 
documented in [1.2].   
 
In this year’s work, an additional three transient scenarios, were selected for the 
generation of PIRTs.  These are the Water Ingress Accident Intermediate Heat Exchanger 
(IHX)/Hydrogen plant side upsets and a rod withdrawal Anticipated Transient Without 
Scram (ATWS).  Details of the scenarios can be found in Chapter 3.  In essence, the 
Water Ingress Accident is one that occurs when there is a tube leak or break that occurs 
in one of the water-cooled heat exchangers utilized in the primary system.  This leads to 
liquid water or steam ingress into the primary system.  The IHX/Hydrogen plant side 
upsets are initiated by malfunctions in the hydrogen plant or the buffer loop and 
associated IHXs.  This could lead to imbalances in the heat removal rate or perhaps even 
secondary coolant inventory entering into the primary system.  The rod withdrawal 
ATWS results from the occurrence of a malfunction in the control rod drive systems or 
the integrated plant control system that leads to the inadvertent withdrawal of a control 
rod from the reactor core.  This results in positive reactivity insertion, a transient 
overpower and normally a reactor trip with scram by the plant protection system (PPS).  
However in the case of an ATWS, a further system malfunction is assumed wherein the 
PPS fails to scram the shutdown rods, and the reactor remains critical.  Chapter 4 details 
the identification of these transient scenario phenomena and the ranking process for the 
PIRTs.  As in FY05, ANL, INL and KAERI have collaborated in the on-going 
companion I-NERI project and are producing consensus high-level PIRTs.  Comments on 
the PIRTs were also received from ORNL [1.3].     
 
Reactor cavity heat transfer from the vessel surface to the RCCS has previously 
been identified as an important phenomenon [1.4].  Progress on definition of modeling 
and experimental needs for the relevant phenomena is summarized in [1.4] and [1.5].  
Maintaining vessel, support structure and concrete integrity during the limiting accidents 
is essential to maintaining coolable geometry for the core in the safety case.   
 
In FY05 and FY06, for all the events which have been screened to date, the 
phenomenon of core flow distribution has been identified as a phenomenon with high 
rank in importance for the safety criteria.  The steady-state core flow and the bypass at 
normal operation sets the core initial peaking conditions for the accidents and transient 
scenarios.  Uncertainty in the initial flow conditions of the core would not only effect the 
fuel margins at the steady-state but would also propagate into the uncertainties on the 
safety criteria for other events in the plant duty cycle.  In the case of the PMR with the 
interblock gaps, radial and axial manufacturing and refueling tolerances for the graphite 
blocks, irradiation swelling and cracking and the distribution of the thermal expansion 
past experience and expertise indicates that the core bypass flow could be a significant 
proportion of the total core flow.  Similarly in the case of the PBR, with the random 
pebble and coolant void distribution, edge effects at the center and side reflectors and the 
sideways leakage through the “loose-fitting” graphite pieces that form these reflectors, a 
similar consensus has been reached that the flow bypassing the core central regions could 
be a significant proportion of the total core flow.  Modeling of this flow is an important 
need.  To further explore the modeling needs for this phenomenon and proceed further 
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with the CSAU process, it was decided to proceed to the step of identifying underlying 
phenomena (“subphenomena”) and performing sensitivity calculations to evaluate the 
relative importance of these subphenomena to the safety criteria.  Eventually these 
sensitivity studies will be utilized in the scaling analysis to filter out non-dimensionless 
groups of lesser importance and also in the weighting of the contribution to the 
uncertainty assessment by each phenomenon.  Chapter 5 details this work and its results 
for both the generic PMR option and the generic PBR option.   
 
In addition to the identification of the core-bypass flow as an important 
phenomenon, the PIRT screening effort has also identified cooling mixing/stratification 
in the plena of the vessel and graphite oxidation of the core and the structures as 
important phenomena that need to be modeled in the thermo-fluid design and safety 
analyses tools.  Plena temperature stratification with streaking and jetting implications 
has consequences for the reactor structure, both under normal operation steady-state and 
accident transient conditions.  Poor mixing of the core outlet jets could lead to spatial and 
temporal temperature variations in the coolant flow exiting the lower plenum.  These 
variations in flow conditions impinging upon the turbine inlet structure and blades could 
lead to thermal cycling and fatigue, which is not optimum for structural integrity.  
Similarly during pressurized accident conditions, streaking of hot plumes into the top 
inlet plenum could also have unintended consequences for the top structures.  
Identification of important subphenomena consequence and modeling and experimental 
needs for plena mixing are being carried out at INL.  The phenomena of exothermic 
graphite oxidation leads to the introduction of an additional heat source separate from the 
decay heat generated by the fission products, which would lead to further primary system 
degradation.  This would increase the fission product source from additional high 
temperature fuel particle failures and transport of fission products from the core to the 
external environment.  Loss of structural strength due to the hasher conditions could lead 
to degradation of the coolable geometry.  Further detail regarding this graphite oxidation 
phenomenon can be obtained in the ORNL reference [1.6].  This ANL report for the GEN 
IV Design & Evaluation Methods task focuses on and documents the work on the 
phenomena of the core flow distribution and the generation of the PIRTs in FY06.  A 
summary of the conclusions to support the VHTR Design Methods Development and 
Validation R&D Program [1.7] is given in Chapter 6.  Proposals for future work are 
discussed. 
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2.0 VHTR Design Description 
 
Generic VHTR candidate design descriptions [2.1] that were used for the 
generation of the PIRTs documented in this report, are given in this chapter.  The 
candidate VHTR designs are an extension of the earlier designs of the Gas Turbine-
Modular High Temperature Reactor (GT-MHR) and the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 
(PBMR). The GT-MHR is a 600MWth direct cycle gas reactor with a prismatic core. 
Reactor operating pressure is 70 bars and outlet temperature is 850oC. The reference 
PBMR is a 400MWth direct cycle gas reactor with a pebble core. Reactor operating 
pressure is 90 bars and outlet temperature is 900oC. Table 2.1 shows the main design 
conditions.  The VHTR differs from these designs mainly in that the target reactor outlet 
temperature will probably be higher, although a specific target has not been defined, and 
the VHTR is to produce hydrogen in addition to electricity.  Both designs are assumed to 
have confinements.  That is, the reactor cavity is vented to atmosphere if the cavity is 
over pressurized.  However, the vent (pressure relief valve) is fitted with a filter to 
minimize the release of harmful material to the environment, and the pressure relief will 
close once the confinement pressure is reduced to an acceptable value.  The two reactor 
system designs differ mainly in the core configuration, that is, prismatic or pebble form 
for the reactor fuel. This has implications in the layout of the vessel and its internals 
particularly from the functional viewpoint of fueling and defueling.   
 
2.1 Prismatic Modular Reactor (PMR) 
 
The prismatic core consists of an inner reflector region surrounded by an annulus 
of fuel blocks that is in turn surrounded by an annulus of outer reflector elements. The 
fuel blocks are composed of hexagonal columns of graphite with circular holes that run 
the length of the column. The fueled holes contain fuel compact that contains TRISO 
particles, while the coolant holes align axially to form coolant channels.  Figure 2.1 
shows the PMR fuel and core plane layout. 
 
Some important parameters and conditions related to the core are given in Table 
2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1  PMR Core and Fuel 
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Table 2.1. Core Parameters and Full Power Operating Conditions 
Parameter GT-MHR PBMR 
Reactor Power, Q (Mwt) 600 400 
Tin/Tout (oC) 491/850 500/900 
Reactor Pressure (bars) 70 90 
Power Density (W/cc) ~ 5 ~ 6.6 
Reactor Mass Flowrate , W (kg/s) 320 147 
Effective Core Height (m) 7.93 ~ 11 
Core Diameter (m) 2.96 ID/4.83 OD 2 ID/3.7 OD 
Number of Fuel Blocks/Pebbles 1020 ~ 450,000 
Bypass Flow Fraction (%) 10 ~ 15 - 
  
For the prismatic core, the helium coolant within the hexagonal blocks follows 
well defined one-dimensional flow paths described by the coolant channels. However, an 
undefined quantity of bypass flow, ranging from ~10% to ~25% of the total coolant, 
moves between the blocks. The bypass flow varies according to the quality of the block 
construction, the movement of the graphite as a function of irradiation and temperature 
and the core design and stacking procedures. Contact heat transfer between the blocks 
plays an important role in transmitting core afterheat during accidents. The moderator in 
the PMR, as in the PBR, is graphite.  Moreover the fuel temperature limits rely on forced 
flow, provided by blowers, of the helium coolant during operation.  The helium coolant 
flow distribution in the core is governed by the differential pressure between the upper 
and lower plena, the friction in the respective flow paths and the local power generation. 
 
The configuration of the PMR primary vessel flow is discussed briefly from the 
perspective of Fig. 2.2.  As with the PBR, the working fluid is helium for the PMR.  The 
helium enters the vessel through an annular pipe near the bottom of the vessel in a 
direction that is at right angles to the axis of the reactor vessel.  In the prismatic design, 
helium flow from the loop is mixed and redistributed in the inlet plenum and flows 
upward through six square riser ducts between the core barrel and the vessel wall.  This is 
a 90-degree turn upward and is distributed into riser channels that lead upward to a top 
plenum that is located over the core. It is collected in the hemispheric top plenum and 
then flow into the core.  The flow is directed downward from the top plenum into the 
core.  It moves from the core into a outlet plenum and is directed to a circular cross-
section pipe (the hot duct) that is mounted at a right angle to the reactor vessel centerline.  
As the helium transits the core, the gas temperature increases (400 ~ 500 °C).  Finally the 
flow enters the power conversion vessel and is directed to the turbine inlet.  In order to 
prevent overheating at the vessel, thermal insulation is provided at the inner side of the 
vessel head. The helium jets discharged from the core are collected and mixed in the 
outlet plenum and then flows out off the vessel to the PCU.  However, considering the 
expected increase in vessel outlet temperature of the VHTR design, the current riser 
design of the prismatic vessel option may not be adequate to meet the design limit of the 
vessel wall temperature.  There may have to be a modification of the vessel internal flow 
path design in order to lower the vessel wall temperature.  One of the options is to have 
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the riser flow channel through the permanent outlet reflector similar to the pebble bed 
reactor design.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Vessel Internal Structures 
 
(b) Vessel Outlet Plenum 
 
Fig. 2.2  PMR Vessel Internals 
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Fig. 2.3  PMR Plant Configuration 
 
The basic concept of the system layout is the same for both designs as far as the 
components of the balance of plant (BOP) is concerned.  The variation of the Brayton 
cycle utilized is similar for both plants.  However, the GT-MHR design adopts an integral 
power conversion unit (PCU) in a vessel and a concentric hot/cold duct that connects the 
reactor system vessel and the PCU system vessel.  This is shown in Fig. 2.3.  Both 
designs rely on passive cooling during any loss-of-power scenario or loss-of-coolant 
scenarios.  The ultimate heat sink is the environment, and all excess heat can be 
transported to the environment without natural circulation cooling inside the vessel via 
heat conduction and radiation to the vessel walls.  From the vessel wall, the heat is 
transported to the environment via a combination of radiation and natural circulation 
transport using some form of RCCS. Air is present in the confinement such that if the 
reactor depressurizes due to a leak in a pipe, air will ultimately ingress into the vessel by 
diffusion.                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
There can be major differences in the RCCS designs. The GT-MHR design uses 
an air-cooled RCCS, while it appears that the AREVA-ANTARES design may be a 
water-cooled RCCS.  A water-cooled RCCS was chosen for the PBMR. An air-cooled 
RCCS was used as the reference in this study for both the PMR and PBR designs since 
not much information is available regarding the ANTARES or PBMR RCCS. In the air-
cooled RCCS design, heat is radiated from the exterior of the reactor vessel wall to a 
series of heat exchangers that are oriented vertically and arranged in a circle around the 
exterior of the reactor vessel. Air flowing within these heat exchangers (ducts) transports 
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the heat to the exterior of the confinement. The air is ducted in from outside the 
containment to these heat exchangers and then outside the confinement. The heat 
exchangers are rectangular ducts with a large aspect ratio and arranged so that one of the 
short sides faces the reactor vessel. This requires that the flow exiting the heat exchangers 
be ducted to chimneys leading to the outside to induce a sufficient natural draft. The 
walls of the heat exchangers and the ducts that connect to them provide a barrier that 
separates the coolant flowing through the heat exchangers from the atmosphere inside the 
reactor/silo confinement. The air-cooled RCCS system is designed to be totally passive 
under all operating condition and has no blowers to power the air flow through the heat 
exchangers. There are 292 risers, each a 5 by 25.4 cm rectangular duct. There is a 5 cm 
gap between adjacent risers and the short sides of each riser face the reactor vessel or the 
downcomer. The full power thermal-hydraulic conditions are given in Table 2.2 and Fig. 
2.4 is a schematic of the RCCS. 
 
Table 2.2 RCCS Duct Dimensions and Operating Conditions 
Parameter Air-cooled RCCS 
RCCS Power (MWth) 3.3 
RCCS Air Flowrate (kg/s) 14.3 
Number of Ducts 292 
Average Duct Air Flowrate (kg/s) 0.049 
Duct Dimensions (m) 0.05 x 0.25 
Hydraulic Diameter (m) 0.083 
Length of Active Core Region (m) 7.93 
 
 
2.2. Pebble Bed Reactor (PBR) 
 
The 400 MWth pebble core consists of approximately 450,000 fuel pebbles that 
are stacked in a graphite reflector structure.  Pebbles are continuously refueled during 
plant operation.  Figure 2.5 shows the axial core layout and fuel for the PBR. The central 
reflector pebbles have been replaced by central graphite reflector column in the recent 
design.  The helium coolant moving through the pebble-bed core follows multi-
dimensional flow paths defined by the pebble-void fraction, which varies as a function of 
core radius, and the individual contact points described by the pebble column.  During 
accidents, radiation and contact heat transfer between pebbles plays an important role in 
transmitting core afterheat to the reactor vessel wall.  The core axial power distribution in 
the pebble core is more apt to be top-skewed than in the prismatic core due to the on-line 
refueling of fresh pebbles from the top.  Even though the underlying design 
characteristics of both VHTR candidates are common and similar, the detailed designs of 
the reactor vessel internals are different in the two cases.  In the pebble bed reactor design 
(see Fig. 2.6), helium flow from the loop is distributed in the donut-like inlet plenum and 
flows upward through the riser consisting of 36 circular channels inside the outer 
reflector. It passes through the slots at the top of the riser and collects in the cylindrical 
top plenum inside the upper graphite structure. It then flows downward to the core. 
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Helium that exits from the core is collected and mixed in the outlet plenum and then 
flows out of the vessel to the PCU. The helium enters the vessel through a circular cross-
section pipe near the bottom of the vessel at a right angle to the vessel axis.  The pebble-
bed core slowly moves downward while the prismatic core is stationary.  The cycle time 
through the core for an individual pebble is approximately 80 days.  The transit distance 
is ~9.5 m.  The reactor kinetics and burnup characteristics are functions of the fuel and 
moderator geometry, the fuel enrichment and the refueling characteristics of the 
respective designs.  Because the pebble-bed core is continuously being replenished as 
spent pebbles are removed from the system (each pebble is cycled through the core 
approximately 9 times), the pebble-bed core generally has a wider spectrum of depletion 
during operation than the prismatic reactor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.4  Schematics of Air-Cooled RCCS 
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Figure 2.7 shows the plant configuration for the PBR.  The PBMR design adopts 
distributed PCU components and separated hot and cold ducts.  This leads to a larger 
footprint for the BOP with major lengths of ducting.  Thermal stratification in the ducting 
may be quite different.  This is an example of event phenomena differences which the 
differences in the design may lead to and which will be detailed in the PIRTs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.5   PBR Core and Fuel 
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Fig 2.6   Pebble Reactor Vessel Internals 
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Fig. 2.7  PBR Plant Configuration 
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3.0 Selection of Accident Sequence 
 
3.1 Background on Sequences 
 
A design plant duty cycle, which lists the types of events and sequences which the 
systems and components must be designed to accommodate, will eventually need to be 
developed for the VHTR/NGNP.  The plant duty cycle includes the modes of operation 
and the plant operational transients as well as the accidents and safety transients that 
should be considered in evaluating the structural design of the systems and components 
of the NSSS.  The spectrum of events that are to be considered range from normal 
operational occurrences (startup, change of load), anticipated operational occurrences 
(AOO)  (e.g., a loss of electrical load resulting from a line fault), off-design transients 
and postulated accidents of low probability (e.g., the sudden loss of integrity of a major 
component) to design basis events (DBE) and beyond.  This spectrum of events dictates 
the requirements for the models of the design and safety analysis tools that are needed.  
Protection of the public requires an assessment of the consequences and frequencies of 
potential fuel failure scenarios.   Figure 3.1 taken from the draft pre-application Safety 
Evaluation Report for the Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) 
[3.1] shows the estimated frequencies/consequences developed by DOE for the General 
Atomics (GA) steam cycle MHTGR.  It shows the ranges for the AOOs and DBEs which 
were presented during the licensing discussions with the NRC.  The Fort St. Vrain plant, 
which could be considered as a predecessor to the MHTGR, was licensed before the 
establishment of the NRC.  Figure 3.1 and the interactions with the NRC over the 
accompanying safety case for the MHTGR was built largely on the LWR experience.  At 
the level of the safety goals and the categorization of the events according to the expected 
frequency of occurrence, the experience could be translated to a certain extent.  However, 
when translating the FSAR Chapter 15 transient and accident classification developed for 
the LWRs, the correspondence is not necessarily one to one.  Table 3.1 shows the Reg 
Guide 1.70 [3.2] categorization. 
 
Table 3.1  FSAR Chapter 15 Accident Categories 
1. Increase in heat removal by the secondary system  
2. Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system  
3. Decrease in reactor coolant system flow rate 
4. Reactivity and power distribution anomalies 
5. Increase in reactor coolant inventory 
6. Decrease in reactor coolant inventory 
7. Radioactive release from a subsystem or component 
8. Anticipated transients without scram 
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               Fig. 3.1  Assignment of Top-Level Regulatory Criteria and Results of Safety  
                             Analysis Source:  DOE, 1986-3 [3.1] 
 
This is to be compared with Table 3.2 which is based on Section IV (Safety 
Analysis) from the Fort St. Vrain FSAR [3.3]. 
 
Table 3.2  Fort St. Vrain Chapter 14 [3.3] 
1. Environmental Disturbances 
2. Reactivity Accidents 
3. Incidents 
3.1  Reactor Core 
3.2  Primary Coolant System 
3.3  Control and Instrumentation System 
3.4  PCRV 
3.5  Secondary Coolant and PCS 
3.6  Electrical System 
3.7  Helium Purification System 
3.8  Helium Storage System 
3.9  Nitrogen System 
4. Loss of Normal Shutdown Cooling 
5. Secondary Coolant System Leakage 
6. Auxiliary System Leakage 
7. Primary Coolant Leakage 
8. Maximum Credible Accident 
9. Maximum Hypothetical Accident 
10. DBA No. 1 “Permanent Loss of Forced Circulation” 
11. DBA No. 2 “Rapid Depressurization/Blowdown” 
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The differences between the LWR table and the HTGR table are evident. 
 
Subsequent to Fort St. Vrain, the next U.S. gas reactor project was the GA 
MHTGR sponsored by DOE.  Table 3.3 taken from [3.1] shows MHTGR occurrences 
and events. 
 
Table 3.3  GA MHTGR Occurrences/Events 
  Occurrence/Event 
A00-1 Main-loop transient with forced core cooling 
A00-2 Loss of main and shutdown cooling loops 
A00-3 Control-rod-group withdrawal with control rod 
trip 
A00-4 Small steam generator leak 
Anticipated Operational 
Occurrences (A00s) 
A00-5 Small primary-coolant leak 
DBE-1 Loss of heat transport system (HTS) and 
shutdown cooling system (SCS) cooling 
DBE-2 HTS transient without control rod trip 
DBE-3 Control-rod withdrawal without HTS cooling 
DBE-4 Control-rod withdrawal without HTS and SCS 
cooling  
DBE-5 Earthquake 
DBE-6 Moisture inleakage 
DBE-7 Moisture inleakage without SCS cooling 
DBE-8 Moisture inleakage with moisture-monitor failure 
DBE-9 Moisture inleakage with steam-generator-dump 
failure 
DBE-10 Primary-coolant leak 
Design-Basis Events 
(DBEs) 
DBE-11 Primary-coolant leak without HTS and SCS 
cooling 
EPBE-1 Moisture inleakage with delayed steam generator 
isolation and without forced cooling 
EPBE-2 Moisture inleakage with delayed steam generator 
isolation Emergency-Planning-Basis Events (EPBEs) EPBE-3 Primary-coolant leak in all four modules with 
neither forced cooling nor helium purification 
system pumpdown 
 
 
This is a cross-section of specific plant occurrences and events selected by DOE 
for analysis.  This was utilized in the licensing interaction with NRC to demonstrate 
compliance with 10 CFR.  Irrespective of whether the Reg Guide 1.70 Chapter 15 
accident categorization or the Fort. St. Vrain Chapter 14 categorization is used, this set of 
occurrences/events was judged to be representative of the plant duty cycle spectrum and 
also limiting.  
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The term “licensing-basis events (LBEs)” was used by DOE to include events 
within the “design-basis” region; that is, events with frequencies ranging from 2 x 10-2 
down to 10-4 per plant-year.  Reference [3.1] discusses two types of events in this 
category.  The first type, identified as design-basis events (DBEs), permits some 
availability and performance of normally operating or standby equipment regardless of its 
quality rating.  These DBEs are listed in Table 3.3.  The first five events are known as 
“pressurized-conduction-cooldown events” that would have the following initiators:  (1) 
loss of all ac power, (2) loss of main heat transport system (HTS) cooling followed by 
failure to trip (an anticipated transient without scram [ATWS] event), (3) control-rod-
group withdrawal followed by the loss of the HTS, (4) rod-group withdrawal with the 
loss of both the HTS and the shutdown cooling system (SCS), and (5) safe-shutdown 
earthquake with loss of both the HTS and the SCS.  Events 6 through 11 are 
“depressurized conduction cooldowns” and, since the primary coolant boundary is 
violated, some DBEs result in small offsite doses based on circulating radioactivity and 
the liftoff of plated-out fission products in the primary system.  In the case of the 
MHTGR with its steam cycle, events 6 through 9 describe various cases of steam 
generator tube leaks and equipment failures.  Events 10 and 11 pertain to primary-system 
leaks from the steam generator vessel and reactor vessel, respectively.  Event 10 analyzes 
a leak area corresponding to a rupture of the primary system pressure relief line.  Event 
11 corresponds to a ruptured instrument line.  
 
 Table 3.4 shows the MHTGR bounding events selected by the NRC for analysis 
[3.1].  Essentially all these events are judged to fall below or within the region entitled by 
DOE as “emergency planning basis” in terms of frequency. 
 
Table 3.4  Bounding Events (BEs) for the MHTGR [3.1] 
Number Event 
BE-1 Inadvertent withdrawal of all control rods, without reactor trip for 36 hours 
(one module): 
(1) Reactor system pressurized, with forced cooling available 
(2) Reactor system pressurized, with reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) 
cooling only 
(3) Reactor system depressurized, with RCCS cooling only 
BE-2 Station blackout (all modules) for 36 hours: 
(1) Reactor system pressurized 
(2) Reactor system depressurized 
BE-3 Loss of forced cooling plus RCCS cooling for 36 hours (one module): 
BE-4 Rupture of justifiable number of steam generator tubes with failure to isolate 
or dump steam generator: 
(1) Reactor system pressurized, RCCS 25 percent unblocked after 36 hours 
(2) Reactor system depressurized, RCCS 25 percent unblocked after 36 hours 
BE-5 Rapid depressurization (one module).  Double-ended guillotine break of 
crossduct with failure to trip (assume RCCS failed for 36 hours and 25 percent 
unblocked thereafter).  Partial control-rod insertion after 36 hours. 
BE-6 Severe external events consistent with those imposed on light-water reactors. 
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In part due to the MHTGR experience, GA in the follow-on GT-MHR design 
project defined four event categories for the GT-MHR plant safety assessment.  This is 
shown in Table 3.5 [3.4]. 
 
Table 3.5 GT MHR Event Categories [3.4] 
Conduction Cooldown 
Turbomachinery Failure Modes 
Heat Exchanger Failure Modes 
Reactivity Excursion 
 
The conduction cooldown category encompass the MHTGR pressurized and 
depressurized conduction cooldown events and are core heatup events that require 
residual heat removal.  Turbomachinery failures are a new class due entirely to the 
novelty of utilizing gas turbines in the power conversion cycle.  Heat exchanger failures 
are primarily water ingress events, while reactivity excursions are a well known class 
though there may now be different types of initiators.  Air ingress would need to be 
considered in this scheme, as part of one of the four categories of events.    
 
Since at this point there does not appear to be an accident categorization system 
officially approved by the NRC for advanced gas-cooled reactors, the collective 
experience provided by the Fort St. Vrain plant, the MHTGR and the GT-MHR has been 
relied upon for the selection of sequences performed in this report.  
 
3.2 FY06 Sequences 
 
In FY05, two design basis events thought to result in the maximum fuel and 
vessel temperatures were selected for PIRT generation.  The Pressurized Conduction 
Cooldown (PCC) event is initiated by a loss of the main heat transport system coolers 
followed by a reactor trip and the failure of the Shutdown cooling System to start.  The 
Depressurized Conduction Cooldown (DCC) event is initiated by a double-guillotine 
break of the coaxial hot-cold pipe that connects the reactor vessel to the Power 
Conversion Vessel.  The reactor trips and the Shutdown Cooling System fail to start.  
Both the PCC and DCC appear in the lists in Tables 3.3 - 3.5.  There are other events in 
Table 3.4 that result in more severe conditions, e.g., the events that result in 
depressurized condition with heat removal by conduction cooling and neutronic power 
generation.  However, the simultaneous occurrence of initiating failures of these events is 
most unlikely and places the events in the beyond-design-basis category.  These events 
are not treated in a licensing safety analysis and so there should be no need for a PIRT.  
The main safety criteria are 1) the maximum fuel temperature should not exceed 1600°C 
and 2) the maximum vessel temperature should not exceed 425°C for the PCC and 530°C 
for the DCC.  These criteria are based on material properties.  In addition for the DCC, 
there is a limit on the radiation release to the environment during blowdown.  The main 
source of radioactivity will be graphite dust that is dislodged during depressurization.  
The PIRT should identify those phenomena and components that are important to 
remaining within these limits.  A third event thought to result in a local hot spot was 
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selected for PIRT generation.  The Load Change is an operational transient initiated by a 
reduction in plant power from full power to a new steady state.  The main concern is the 
relocation of a structure hot spot during the transient and the thermal stresses generated.  
The temperature field at the turbine inlet piping has been suggested as an area for 
concern. [3.5] 
 
In FY06, the focus is on (i) Water Ingress, (ii) Rod Runout, and (iii) Hydrogen 
Plant Upset. The selection of a scenario for PIRT generation is guided by the criterion for 
probability of occurrence and consequence of outcome. The approach is to identify 
candidate scenarios and evaluate them with respect to the criterion.  
 
3.2.1 Water Ingress 
 
Water Ingress candidate scenarios have the following components: a potential 
pathway under which water can enter the primary system, the initial plant condition, an 
initiating event, subsequent failures and any protection system actions that stabilize the 
event. Once scenarios have been listed, they are ranked according to probability of 
occurrence and outcome and the scenario that best meets the criterion is selected for 
PIRT generation. This approach is taken below and the results appear in Table 3.6. 
 
The GT-MHR has four water-based cooling systems for which there is a potential 
pathway to the primary coolant circuit. They are the Intercooler, the Precooler, the 
Shutdown Cooler and the Generator Cooling Systems. [3.4] 
 
Heat exchanger tube failure is a primary initiating event for water ingress. It has a 
frequency of occurrence of approximately 0.01/reactor/year placing it in the anticipated 
upset category. With proper functioning of cooling loop isolation equipment the water 
inventory entering the primary system will be small and not of significant safety 
consequence. If, however, the leak is not isolated, the event becomes one of high 
consequence and of interest to safety analyses and, therefore, PIRT generation.  
 
The initial plant conditions are at-power and shutdown. At full power, the 
pressure in the four water-based cooling circuits is less than the pressure in the primary 
circuit [3.4] and so a leak in one of these heat exchangers would result in flow, at least 
initially, out of the primary system into the water circuit. However, at partial power and 
assuming inventory control, the pressure in the primary system will drop below that of 
the Shutdown Cooling System [3.4]. In that case, water would flow into the primary 
system. The progression would depend on subsequent failures and on protective system 
actions. 
 
Several combinations of the preceding italicized scenario components were 
examined to identify a scenario with the requisite probability and safety consequence for 
PIRT generation. Engineering judgment played a role in the selection of these scenarios. 
They are shown in Table 3.6. The first scenario assumes shutdown, either for refueling 
and maintenance, and, hence, the primary system is depressurized. A potential pressure 
differential for driving water into the primary system through a leak in any of these four 
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water-based systems would be small, possibly gravity driven. It is assumed the leak is 
safely isolated. During refueling the control rod drivelines are disconnected from the rods 
making it all but impossible for the rods to be removed by human or active system 
failure. Because coolant loop isolation is achieved, only a limited amount of water enters 
the primary system. It is assumed heat removal at decay power levels is provided by the 
RCCS. The fuel temperatures should remain safe. This event does not satisfy the small 
probability/high consequence criterion for PIRT generation. 
 
The second scenario in Table 3.6 assumes the plant is at power and that a leak 
develops in a heat exchanger but that it is isolated so water ingress into the primary 
system is limited. Isolating the leak additionally closes the pathway between the primary 
system and the cooling circuit preventing primary coolant from flowing into the cooling 
circuit. The reactor is scrammed and decay heat is removed by the RCCS. Again this 
event does not satisfy the small probability/high consequence criterion for PIRT 
generation. 
 
The third scenario in Table 3.6 assumes again that the plant is at power and that a 
leak develops in a heat exchanger tube, but this time it is not isolated. Of the four cooling 
circuits, the positive driving force required for water to enter the primary system can exist 
only for the Shutdown Cooling System and only at reduced power. During normal 
operation the SCS coolant enters the reactor vessel and reaches temperatures that require 
it to be pressurized. By contrast the Precooler, Intercooler, and Generator Cooler all 
operate at low temperature (<150 C) so they are near atmospheric pressure. With 
inventory control at less than 70 percent full power the pressure in the reactor vessel 
drops below the pressure in the SCS so a positive driving force exists for water ingress. 
In summary, the third scenario in Table 3.6 assumes water enters the primary circuit 
through a SCS heat exchanger leak, the SCS is not isolated, and that the primary system 
remains pressurized since the SCS is also a pressurized system. The reactor is scrammed 
and decay heat is removed by the RCCS. Hydrolysis of core graphite would occur. The 
water inventory in the SCS is an important factor in this scenario. At this time, we do not 
know the inventory. The probability of this scenario is the product of the probability of a 
heat exchanger leak (10-2/year) times the probability of failure to isolate (10-3/year). This 
places the scenario in the Design Basis category. In combination with the possibility for 
significant fuel erosion through hydrolysis, this scenario appears to fit the criterion for 
requiring a safety analysis. 
 
The fourth scenario in Table 3.6 takes in the possibility of significant water 
entering the reactor vessel at the depressurized condition. At the depressurized condition 
sufficient driving head through gravity alone might exist for water to enter through a heat 
exchanger tube leak in the Intercooler, Precooler, Shutdown Cooling, or Generator 
Cooling circuits. The scenario assumes the reactor is initially at power, there is a small 
leak in the reactor pressure boundary without isolation (10-4/year) followed by a tube leak 
in one of the four cooling circuits (10-2/year) but with failure to isolate (10-3/year). The 
probability of this scenario is exceedingly small making it inappropriate for a first round 
PIRT. However, if the initial plant condition is shutdown for refueling/maintenance then 
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the combined probability of a tube leak and failure to isolate is 10-5/year making this a 
candidate for a first round PIRT. 
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Table 3.6  Scenarios for Water Ingress with Probability and Outcome 
Sequence Safety Analysis Pathways 
for Water 
Ingress Initial Plant 
Condition 
Initiating Event Subsequent 
Failures 
Terminal 
Condition 
Probability 
(/year) 
Outcome 
SCS 
Precooler 
Intercooler 
Generator 
Cooler 
Shutdown for 
Refueling/ 
Maintenance 
Tube leak in water-
circuit HX followed 
by isolation. 
- Pressurized, 
scrammed, and 
heat removal by 
RCCS. 
Anticipated 
(10-2) 
Safe 
 
SCS 
Precooler 
Intercooler 
Generator 
Cooler 
At Power Tube leak in water-
circuit HX followed 
by isolation. 
- Pressurized, 
scrammed, and 
heat removal by 
RCCS. 
Anticipated 
(10-2) 
Safe 
SCS 
Precooler 
Intercooler 
Generator 
Cooler 
At Power Tube leak in a water-
circuit HX. 
Failure to isolate 
HX. 
 
Pressurized, 
scrammed, and 
heat removal by 
RCCS. 
Design Basis 
(10-2*10-3)  
Function of 
water inventory 
entering core. 
SCS 
Precooler 
Intercooler 
Generator 
Cooler 
At Power Small leak in 
pressure boundary 
without isolation 
(result is DCC). 
Tube leak in a 
water-circuit HX. 
Failure to isolate 
leak. 
Depressurized, 
scrammed, and 
heat removal by 
RCCS. 
Beyond Design 
Basis  
(10-4*10-2*10-3) 
Function of 
water inventory 
entering core. 
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It was also instructive to examine a water ingress scenario treated in the licensing 
of the MHTGR for its applicability to the GT-MHR. [3.6] The reactor is at full power 
when there is a rapid (of the order 10 seconds) ingress of large amounts of water such 
that the core helium is completely displaced by high temperature water vapor and the two 
independent reactivity shutdown systems fail to act. The source of high pressure water 
was a steam generator. In the GT-MHR there are water inventories in the Precooler and 
Intercooler Systems greater than in the MHTGR. At normal operation however, the 
pressure is significantly less than the primary system since the highest temperature in the 
coolers is less than 130 C, and, hence, there is not a physical means for transferring the 
cooler water to the primary system. The SCS is the only water-cooled heat removal 
system where the driving pressure during at-power operation appears sufficient to 
introduce inleakage into the primary coolant circuit. A SCS leak appears to be analogous 
to a steam generator leak in the MHTGR. In the GT-MHR at less than 70 percent power, 
there is a positive driving force for inleakage from the SCS, which is located in the 
reactor vessel directly downstream of the core. Presently, It is not clear that the SCS 
would have near the water inventory found in the steam generator of the MHTR since the 
heat removal capability is only a few percent of full power. Since the scenario just 
described consists of four failures, the probability of occurrence is vanishingly small so a 
first round PIRT is not warranted. 
 
The accident scenario selected for PIRT generation is the third case in Table 3.6 
with the assumption that the water ingress is from a leak in the Shutdown Cooling 
System and not from a leak in the Precooler, Intercooler, or Generator Cooling Systems 
for reasons described earlier. The third case of Table 3.5 meets the probability/outcome 
criterion described earlier.  
 
3.2.2 Rod Runout 
 
There are two scenarios for rod runout. One is runout of all control rods with the 
reactor shutdown for maintenance or refueling. The vessel is depressurized and heat 
removal is by the Shutdown Cooling System. The other is rod runout while at power. 
Safety analysis required for the VHTR will likely include simulation of both scenarios. 
As a consequence, PIRTs, will be needed to ensure all important phenomena have been 
included in the simulation. The present work, however, is to develop PIRTs for those 
accidents that present the most complex and off-normal behavior but still fall within the 
realm of possibility. The rod runout at power scenario includes thermal-hydraulic 
phenomena that are not present in the shutdown case. These involve primarily the thermal 
hydraulics related to operation of the balance of plant. The rod runout while at power is, 
therefore, selected for PIRT generation. 
 
3.2.3 Hydrogen Plant Upset 
 
For the Hydrogen Plant upset scenario, several factors are considered in the 
selection and definition of the scenario. The reactor protection system is assumed to 
perform its function by scramming the reactor when limiting safety settings are exceeded. 
The scenario that involves an intermediate loop leak cannot be addressed at this time. In 
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this scenario, coolant can leak into containment or into the primary system, but since at 
this time the intermediate coolant is not known, the phenomena associated with the fluid 
behavior inside containment or the primary system cannot be identified. The other 
scenario identified the unscheduled change in the heat load posed by the hydrogen plant 
at the interface is selected for PIRT generation. According to our earlier criterion (high 
consequence and low probability) this event is not a prime candidate for PIRT analysis.  
This is because the probability of core damage is much less than 10-4 per reactor year, 
and the probability of a significant radiation release is much less than 10-6 per reactor 
year since the reactor is successfully scrammed. However, precedence for performing a 
PIRT exists since the primary system energy balance upset caused by an event in the 
hydrogen plant parallels events that appear in the Fort Saint Vrain Reactor safety analysis 
report. These are an increase in cooling due to steam line break and a decrease in cooling 
due to loss of feedwater flow event. 
 
The selection of a scenario is reduced to one of two choices: protected 
overcooling and protected undercooling of the primary system. For overcooling, the 
hydrogen plant is limited in its capacity to overcool the reactor. Heat transfer mechanisms 
and surface areas typically do not support increases in heat removal rates of beyond a few 
tens of a percent above normal. The exception is a large break in a heat transfer 
component that has a large pressurized liquid inventory with two-phase heat transfer 
occurring on depressurization. At this time, there is insufficient design information for 
the hydrogen plant to identify such a component. For under-cooling by the hydrogen 
plant, there are a number of perceived mechanisms by which the heat removal rate could 
fall to near zero. These include closure of a valve, stoppage of pumps on loss of electrical 
power or shutdown of the chemical process for safety reasons. The scenario selected for 
PIRT analysis then is an upset in the hydrogen plant that leads to a loss of cooling at the 
interface between the reactor and hydrogen plant. 
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4.0 Phenomena Identification and Ranking Tables (PIRTs) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it was determined early in FY06 that PIRTs would be 
generated for three events that are likely to require safety analyses based on prior 
licensing of gas reactor designs. The water ingress event was an important accident case 
for the MHTGR.[4.1]  One objective is to determine how the water ingress event in the 
VHTR might differ from the MHTGR. This includes examining differences in how water 
could enter the primary system. The rod reactivity insertion event is an anticipated event, 
and when followed by a failure to scram has important safety consequences. The current 
regulatory requirement for considering failure to scram arose in part from such an 
incident in the Fort Saint Vrain gas reactor.[4.2]  The second event then is rod 
withdrawal with failure to scram. The third event is an upset in the hydrogen plant, an 
event not previously analyzed for HTGR since hydrogen production was not previously 
considered. The upset, however, results in an imbalance between reactor heat generation 
and removal making it similar to the overcooling and undercooling examined in safety 
studies of earlier gas reactors.  
 
For each of these events, Chapter 3.0 identified the scenario that has the requisite 
level of probability and consequence. This is taken as the level that would precipitate the 
need for a safety analysis. Generally a safety analysis is required for those events where 
the probability of core damage is greater than 10-4 per reactor year and the probability of 
a significant radiation release is greater than 10-6 per reactor year. PIRT generation for 
these events is to support validation of the models in the computer code that is to be used 
in the safety analysis. This is the procedure followed for the large break LOCA safety 
studies performed for light-water reactors in the 1980s. Similarly, the work of this Gen 
IV VHTR task uses this procedure for accidents in the VHTR beginning with the 
conduction cooldown events for which PIRTS were generated in FY05. 
 
There are presently three competing VHTR gas reactor designs – Antares by 
AREVA, the Westinghouse/South African PBMR design, and the GT-MHR by General 
Atomics. Consistent with our prior work [4.3], the study is mainly limited to the GT-
MHR, and then, modifications are made according to generic design perturbations.  With 
this approach to design differences, the aggregated PIRTs for the 3 events discussed on 
this chapter are presented at the end of the chapter.  The main body of the chapter 
presents a discussion by event, of phenomena which occur in the various affected plant 
component at each phase of the event.  
 
4.1 Water Ingress PIRT  
 
Water ingress into the primary coolant system gives rise to new phenomena 
compared to those present at normal operation and thus is of interest from a safety 
standpoint. A sudden introduction of water into the core can change the neutronic 
characteristics of the core resulting in positive reactivity with a resulting increase in 
power. [4.4]  If the power increase is large enough and the reactor fails to scram, fuel 
temperature safety limits will be exceeded followed by fuel microsphere failure. Water 
that enters the hot regions of the primary circuit will vaporize resulting in an increase in 
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the primary system pressure. This same coolant may condense at the coolers and enter the 
compressors as entrained liquid causing erosion and vibration. In addition, the hydrolysis 
of graphite in the core by water [4.5] can weaken the microsphere fission product barrier 
resulting in leakage of fission products into the primary system coolant. For this to 
happen however, the water must first permeate the outer graphite shell in the case of fuel 
balls and the graphite matrix in the case of the fuel blocks. A leak that introduces water 
into the primary system can lead to vessel over pressure causing the pressure vessel relief 
valves to lift and fission products to escape the primary system boundary. Finally, in 
those designs that employ a draft air RCCS for off-normal heat removal, water vapor and 
hydrolysis products (CO and H2) escaping the primary vessel may enter the gap between 
the reactor vessel exterior and RCCS wall. Radiation heat transfer across this gap is an 
important means for removing residual heat in cooling accidents, and the presence of 
these gases may impede heat transfer. [4.6] This phenomena also applies to those designs 
which employ the alternative water cooled RCCS. 
 
4.1.1 Scenario and Safety Criteria 
 
It is assumed that the reactor is operating at less than 70 percent thermal power, 
and, hence, the pressure of the water in the SCS heat exchanger is greater than the 
primary system pressure. A breach in the SCS heat exchanger develops, and water flows 
into the primary system. It is assumed the SCS loop cannot be isolated so the water 
continues to flow into the reactor vessel. While this water may initially collect at the 
bottom of the reactor vessel, it will eventually vaporize leading to an increase in primary 
system pressure. Depending on how quickly it vaporizes, a reactor trip signal will be 
generated on either overpressure, or as the vapor is transported through the primary 
system, a trip will be generated on moisture detection. It is assumed that the reactor does 
scram, and that the turbomachine also trips. Depending on the neutronic characteristics of 
the core, before scram the vapor may add positive reactivity causing power to increase 
and generate a reactor trip signal on overpower. If vapor is transported to the power 
conversion vessel it will condense in the coolers. The condensate might be entrained in 
the helium and be transported to the compressors where an acoustic signal might be 
generated. The presence of water in the helium coolant could be expected to alter the 
performance characteristics of the turbomachine. On scramming of the reactor, the 
shutdown cooling system will start automatically and provide cooling. In the presence of 
a SCS heat exchanger tube leak, the SCS cannot necessarily be relied upon to provide 
heat removal. Either way, since the SCS is a safety system, the SCS circulator will 
continue to run. The SCS heat exchangers are located above the SCS check valve, which 
will be closed until the SCS circulator turns on. Water that does not vaporize will collect 
above the check valve until the circulator operates. 
 
Upon scramming of the reactor, the turbomachine will trip and coast down. 
During this time the coolers will become less effective in removing heat so heat removal 
by the RCCS becomes more significant. There will be some cooling of the core by 
vaporization of the SCS water. Hydrolysis of graphite in the fuel elements may weaken 
the fission product barriers permitting fission products to enter the primary system 
coolant. If the pressure relief valves open on overpressure, some of these fission products 
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may enter the confinement. Opening of the pressure relief valve will remove energy from 
the primary system. The power of the core before scram will depend on the net reactivity 
which depends on the core temperature which depends on the imbalance between heat 
generation and heat removal. The reactivity will also depend on the effect of the water 
vapor on the fission process. 
 
The relevant safety criteria depend on the progression of the accident. The peak 
fuel temperature is expected to increase as is the peak vessel temperature since cooling is 
provided by only the RCCS. The reactor vessel pressure relief system would prevent 
primary pressure boundary pressure limit from being exceeded but could result in fission 
products entering confinement. Thus, peak fuel temperature, peak vessel temperature, and 
confinement radiation limits are the relevant safety criteria.  
 
4.1.2 Components 
 
The components participating are the same components as in PCC event, and 
additionally the Shutdown Cooling System, the Lower Head, and the Pressure Boundary. 
A list is given in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1  Components Participating in Water Ingress Scenario 
Systems Components 
Inlet Plenum 
Riser 
Top Plenum and Components 
Core & Reflectors (Includes Bypass) 
Outlet Plenum and Components 
Lower Head 
Reactor Vessel 
Pressure Boundary 
Hot/Cold Pipe Reactor Coolant Loop Compressor (Direct) or Circulator (Indirect) 
Reactor Cavity (Confinement) 
RCCS Tube (Air Duct) RCCS 
RCCS Piping and Chimney 
Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) Heat Exchanger and Pump 
 
 
4.1.3 Phases and Phenomena  
 
4.1.3.1 Pre Turbomachine-Trip Phase 
 
The discharge flow through the SCS heat exchanger leak into the primary system 
will depend on the pressure drop across the leak and the flow regime. The rate at which 
the leak water vaporizes depends on the flowrate through the leak, the rate at which 
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stored energy is removed from structures that interact with the liquid water, and the 
contact area of the water with structures and helium. The water that does not vaporize 
will collect on top of the SCS check valve, which lies below the SCS heat exchangers. 
The concentration of water vapor in the core depends on not only the preceding but also 
on the relative flowrate of helium to water vapor and the rate at which vapor is circulated 
to the coolers.  It will condense and perhaps collect at the bottom of the coolers which 
effectively removes it from circulation. The presence of water vapor in the primary 
coolant will alter the performance characteristics of the turbomachine. Until the check 
valve opens there is not a mechanism to transport two-phase water through the system. 
 
The core reactivity will be a function of usual reactivity components when at 
power but, additionally, the concentration of water vapor in the core. The water vapor 
will act to soften the spectrum, which will add reactivity if the core is undermoderated. 
The vapor combined with increased pressure will increase neutron scattering, which will 
reduce leakage and result in added reactivity. Reduced flux at the core periphery will 
reduce the worth of external control rods or poisons adding reactivity. Increased neutron 
absorption by the water will reduce reactivity. The net reactivity effect of all these 
processes will be core design and vapor concentration dependent. Prior to scram, the 
temperature of the core will tend toward a value that gives a net reactivity of zero. 
 
4.1.3.2 Post Turbomachine-Trip Phase 
 
When the turbomachine is tripped and coasts down, the primary means for heat 
removal changes. The RCCS will remove heat from the primary system, while additional 
energy will be removed if the primary system pressure relief valves open. The SCS will 
automatically activate, but the presence of a leak in the heat exchanger makes the heat 
removal capability uncertain. The SCS blower will run which will cause the check valve 
to open and water to be blown into the reactor inlet plenum. Since the blower is driving 
convection in the primary circuit, heat transfer and pressure drop are in the forced 
convection regime rather than mixed convection regime. There may be a maldistribution 
of water vapor entering the top plenum as a consequence of an asymmetry in the location 
of the water leak and/or the point where the water enters the inlet plenum. Hydrolysis of 
graphite will occur and possibly release fission products into the primary system. 
 
4.2. Rod Withdrawal Anticipated Transient without Scram PIRT 
 
Withdrawal of a control rod while the reactor is critical combined with a failure to 
scram will give rise to phenomena not present at normal operation. The PIRT provides an 
importance ranking of these phenomena and a basis for ensuring they are adequately 
represented in a safety analysis. In the rod withdrawal event, it is assumed that all control 
systems operate normally with the exception of the reactor power control system. This 
system is assumed to fail such that all rods except the withdrawn rod remain fixed in 
position. Then the only means for compensating for the reactivity insertion associated 
with the withdrawn rod is through passive reactivity feedback. 
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From an earlier discussion, an accident is a good candidate for PIRT generation if 
the probability of core damage is greater than 10-4 per reactor year and the probability of 
a significant radiation release is greater than 10-6 per reactor year. Recall these criteria are 
derived from the light water reactor industry. The probability of an uncontrolled rod 
runout is less than unity per reactor year and the failure to scram all three shutdown 
systems, i.e. control and safety rods and the reserve shutdown system, is much less than 
10-6 per reactor year (the value used in LMR and LWR safety analyses is 10-6 per reactor 
year based on two independent shutdown systems). So the probability of radiation release 
will be significantly below 10-6 per reactor year. How much below is in part dependent on 
the phenomena and their role in limiting fuel temperature. 
 
As an aside, conditions unique to the VHTR could alter the above assumed 
probability for failure to scram. One mechanism that may need to be considered in 
establishing this probability involves the chemical corrosion of steels exposed to water at 
high temperature. In the Fort Saint Vrain reactor, corrosion products from the reaction of 
water vapor with carbon steel components in the control rod drive system interfered with 
gravity feed insertion of the rods during a scram event.[4.8] The presence of water 
cooling circuits that interface with the primary system in the VHTR and the significantly 
higher operating temperatures may result in an increased probability of corrosion and, 
hence, failure to scram compared to an Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR). This risk might be 
minimized through the use of high-quality corrosion-resistant steels. A second 
mechanism that may alter the probability of failure to scram is suggested in [4.9]. There 
is a possibility that surface conditions on stainless steels in a dry helium environment 
with some oxygen present may result in sticking between sliding surfaces in control rod 
drivelines. 
 
4.2.1 Scenario and Safety Criteria 
 
The scenario begins with withdrawal of a control rod without active reactivity 
compensation. The core power rises in response causing fuel and reactor outlet 
temperature and system pressure to increase resulting in an automatic trip of the 
turbomachine and a scram signal. The reactor fails to scram. The coastdown of the 
turbomachine and consequent reduction of reactor cooling may cause fuel and reactor 
outlet temperature to increase further. Reactor power begins to decrease as negative 
reactivity associated with fuel temperature increase is introduced. The plant control 
system operates to run back the power. The cooler power is successfully reduced but the 
rods remain fixed in position. The SCS automatically starts up to provide active cooling 
of the core. The RCCS will cool the reactor vessel by virtue of the draft air circuit always 
being in place. As neutronic power decreases the removal of xenon no longer proceeds at 
a rate in equilibrium with its generation. The reactor eventually goes subcritical on xenon 
poisoning. As the xenon inventory decays criticality re-occurs. The reactor may oscillate 
in and out of criticality. The reactor continues to cooldown until an equilibrium zero-
power critical state is reached. 
 
The key response of the reactor is an initial increase in power which leads to an 
increase in temperatures in the core, the upper reflector, and the top of the reactor 
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pressure vessel. The important safety limits are peak fuel temperature and vessel wall 
temperature. 
 
4.2.2 Components 
 
The plant components participating in this event are listed in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2  Components Participating in Rod Withdrawal ATWS Scenario 
Systems Components 
Inlet Plenum 
Riser 
Top Plenum and Components 
Core & Reflectors (Includes Bypass) 
Reactor Vessel 
Outlet Plenum and Components 
Hot/Cold Pipe Reactor Coolant Loop Compressor (Direct) or Circulator (Indirect) 
Shutdown Cooling System Heat Exchanger and Pump 
Reactor Cavity (Confinement) 
RCCS Tube (Air Duct) RCCS 
RCCS Piping, Air Cooler and Chimney 
 
4.2.3 Phases and Phenomena 
 
4.2.3.1 Pre Turbomachine-Trip Phase 
 
The time history of the reactivity addition resulting from the uncompensated rod 
withdrawal is a function of the rod worth gradient and the rod withdrawal rate. The total 
rod worth will be a function of the excess reactivity built into the core. In the PBR, this is 
maintained small by continual refueling. In the PMR, a burnable poison is used to limit 
the excess reactivity.  The ratio of fuel to graphite in the core results in a neutron 
spectrum that is thermal rather than fast. Since the core dimensions are large compared to 
the mean free path of a thermal neutron, the reactor power response has a spatial 
dependence that requires space-time kinetics for precise prediction. Control rods closest 
to the core center will have greater worth than those at the periphery. There will be local 
flux peaking in the vicinity of the withdrawn rod. As the core power increases, the plant 
control system will attempt to maintain constant power removal via the generator. The 
reactor system temperature will increase as a result of the imbalance between heating and 
cooling and as a result reactor pressure will increase. The turbomachine will trip on either 
reactor outlet temperature, power, or primary system pressure. 
 
4.2.3.2 Coastdown Phase 
 
Upon the loss of the generator as an energy sink, the plant control system will 
attempt to reduce the heat generation and heat removal rates to bring the plant to a 
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shutdown state. The turbomachine will coastdown as the cooler powers are reduced, and 
the bypass valve is opened. The reactor temperature will continue to increase until 
sufficient negative reactivity due to Doppler feedback is developed to bring neutronic 
power production into equilibrium with heat removal rate. The rate of core temperature 
increase will be a function of the core heat capacity. The increase in reactor temperature 
caused by the heat from decay products minus the heat removed through the Shutdown 
Cooling System and the Reactor Cavity Cooling System. The reactor may eventually go 
subcritical as temperatures rise above those that produce neutronic equilibrium.  
 
4.2.3.3 Post Turbomachine-Trip Equilibrium Phase 
 
As decay power decreases over time, temperatures will eventually begin to drop 
reaching values for which net reactivity exclusive of xenon reactivity is zero. Then, if it 
were not for xenon poisoning, the neutronic power would assume a value in equilibrium 
with heat removal rate. Further out in time, sufficient xenon will have decayed and core 
temperatures will have decreased on reduced decay heating that recriticality occurs. 
Power oscillations are possible as temperature feedbacks, xenon generation, and heat 
removal processes interact in a dynamic manner. With increased viscosity in hotter 
channels coupled with potential overcooling of cooler channels by SCS flow there may 
be the potential for selective undercooling.[4.10] 
 
4.3 Hydrogen Plant Upset PIRT 
 
The VHTR has the capability to generate both electricity and hydrogen. In the 
U.S., the DOE plans are for generation of both products, while KAERI plans are to 
generate hydrogen only. The schematic of the U.S. concept in Fig. 4.1 shows two parallel 
heat transfer paths from the reactor, one for electricity production and one for hydrogen 
production. In the KAERI concept, shown in Fig. 4.2, a single heat transfer path from the 
reactor delivers process heat to the chemical plant. In both design concepts the heat 
transfer path to the chemical plant is composed of a series of intermediate process heat 
loops. The thermal power delivered to the hydrogen plant in the U.S. concept is less than 
50 MWt which is modest when compared to the reactor thermal power of 600 MWt. In 
the KAERI version of the VHTR, the entire reactor thermal output is delivered to the 
chemical plant. 
 
An upset in the hydrogen plant will propagate through the series of intermediate 
heat transfer loops that couple the hydrogen plant to the reactor. The result will be an 
imbalance between energy production in the primary system and energy removal from 
the primary system. Because a PIRT is directed at reactor systems computer code 
qualification, the focus of the PIRT is on the resulting phenomena in the reactor plant and 
how they depend on the boundary conditions at the interface between the hydrogen and 
nuclear plants. Thus, it is not necessary to represent the specifics of an upset in the 
hydrogen plant, just the net result from a heat transfer standpoint as seen at the interface. 
An energy imbalance in the primary system can arise from either an unscheduled change 
in the heat load posed by the hydrogen plant as seen at the interface (either overcooling or 
undercooling) or as a change in heat load seen at the interface as the result of a leak of 
coolant in one of the intermediate loops and subsequent loss of heat transfer capability.
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Fig. 4.1  Schematic of Equipment Layout for VHTR Co-Generation Plant 
Fig. 4.2  Schematic of Equipment Layout for VHTR Hydrogen-Only Plant (from KAERI) 
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An upset in the hydrogen plant may also result in a change in generator electrical load if 
the hydrogen plant is a significant consumer of electricity as in the case of High 
Temperature Steam Electrolysis (HTSE). 
 
4.3.1 Scenario and Safety Criteria 
 
The specific set of events that gives rise to a reduction in heat utilization in the 
hydrogen plant is unimportant for PIRT generation. Rather, the focus is on the loss of 
cooling of the primary system that is communicated through the intermediate system that 
interfaces to the hydrogen plant. The phenomena in the primary system that determine the 
response are the focus of the PIRT.  Over cooling events will be evaluated in the future 
since an overcooling initiator could also eventually lead to a trip of the hydrogen plant 
and thereby an undercooling event. 
 
A loss of cooling creates an imbalance between the heat production and heat 
removal rates in the primary system. If the plant control system does not act to reduce 
core power, then the energy in the primary system will increase leading to primary 
system temperature increase and an increase in the pressure of the coolant. In the US 
design, the hydrogen plant represents a heat load of 50 MWt out of a total load of 
600MWt so management of this event might be achieved through control system action 
alone with the plant reaching a new equilibrium condition before a reactor scram signal is 
generated. On the other hand in the KAERI design, loss of cooling by the hydrogen plant 
would result in a complete loss of heat sink and so the reactor would trip on over- 
temperature at the core outlet. The primary system circulator and the intermediate system 
circulators would also trip to prevent thermal shock in hot structures. 
 
The key response of the reactor is an increase in temperature and pressure. The 
important safety limits are core outlet temperature and vessel pressure. 
 
4.3.2 Components 
 
The plant components participating in this event are listed in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3  Components Participating in Hydrogen Plant Upset 
Systems Components 
Inlet Plenum 
Riser 
Top Plenum and Components 
Core & Reflectors (Includes Bypass) 
Reactor Vessel 
Outlet Plenum and Components 
Hot/Cold Pipe 
Compressor (Direct) or Circulator (Indirect) 
Intermediate Heat Exchange and Circulator Reactor Coolant Loop 
Mixing Junction (US VHTR) 
Shutdown Cooling System Heat Exchanger and Pump 
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4.3.3 Phases and Phenomena 
 
4.3.3.2 Pre Protection-System Trip Phase 
 
The loss of heat removal by the hydrogen plant results in the hot intermediate 
system coolant which enters the hydrogen plant heat exchanger being returned un-cooled 
to the cold leg of the intermediate system. This temperature front then enters the heat 
exchanger that interfaces to the primary system with the result that heat removal from this 
heat exchanger is reduced. The temperature of the primary side coolant leaving this heat 
exchanger increases and in the U.S. design mixes with cooler coolant from the power 
conversion unit before or upon entering the reactor vessel depending on where the mixing 
tee is located. The mixing may cause thermal striping at the point of mixing. In the 
KAERI design, there is no mixing tee and the primary side coolant leaving the primary 
system heat exchanger enters the reactor. The reduction in primary system cooling results 
in reactor inlet temperature increase and negative reactivity insertion. The core power 
decreases and the core outlet may be temporarily overcooled. The average temperature in 
the high pressure side of the primary system increases as energy accumulates resulting in 
an increase in pressure. If the plant control system is not able to bring reactor power into 
balance with heat removal rate before primary system operating limits are exceeded, then 
the reactor will trip followed by the various circulators to avoid thermal shocking of hot 
structures. 
 
4.3.3.2 Post Protection-System Trip Phase 
 
The turbomachine and intermediate system circulators will coastdown. As normal 
cooling by the coolers is lost, the Shutdown Cooling System will come on-line. The upset 
will transition into normal plant shutdown. 
 
The PIRTs for these three sequences follow in Tables 4.4(a) to 4.4(i).  Each table 
is for the plant component which participates in the sequence.  The ranking system used 
is H=high, M=medium, and a blank entry indicates low or no effect.  The columns for 
each sequence represent the transient phases of the particular sequence.  
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Table 4.4 (a) PIRT for Inlet Plenum+ 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Flow Distribution  H H H  H H 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection)  M M M   M 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection)  M H H  H H 
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Thermal Mixing and Stratification  H      
Pressure Waves        
Thermal Shock      H H 
Two-Phase Flow  H      
Hydrolysis        
 
 
Table 4.4 (b) PIRT for Riser 
Water 
Ingress  
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Flow Distribution  M M M M  H 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection)  M   M  M 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection)  M H H M H H 
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Radiation Heat Transfer  H  M H   
Gas Conduction     M   
Hydrolysis of Graphite        
Two-Phase Flow  H      
Thermal Shock      H H 
 
+H = High 
 M = Medium 
 -   = Low/No Effect 
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Table 4.4 (c) PIRT for Table for Top Plenum & Components 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Flow Distribution  H H H M H H 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection)    M M  M 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection)   H M M H M 
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Thermal Mixing and Stratification     M H H 
Hot Plumes     H   
Fluid Properties    M    
Thermal Resistance/Heat Capacity of Shroud     H   
Hydrolysis of Graphite        
Pressure Waves        
Two-Phase Flow  M      
Thermal Shock      H H 
 
Table 4.4 (d) PIRT for Core and Reflector (including Bypass) 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Flow Distribution H H H H H H H 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection) H  H H H H H 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection) M  H M H H M 
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Initial Stored Energy    H   H 
Power Distribution   H H H H H 
Decay Heat (including Power Distribution) H H  H H  H 
Reactivity Feedback   H H H H  
Xenon Concentration   H H H   
Control Rod Worth and Gradient   H H H   
Space-Time Kinetics   H H H   
Fuel/Reflector Conductivity M H M M H M M 
Fuel/Reflector Specific Heat M H M M H M M 
Multi-D Heat Conduction Including Contact H H M H H M H 
Gas Conduction (Including Gaps)  M   M   
Radiation Heat Transfer  H   H   
Hydrolysis of Graphite  H      
Fluid Properties        
Core Configuration        
Pressure Waves        
Two-Phase Flow  H      
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Table 4.4 (e)  PIRT for Outlet Plenum & Components 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Flow Distribution H  H H H H H 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection) M  H M M H M 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection) M  H M M H M 
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Thermal Mixing and Stratification H    H   
Jet Discharge M  H   H  
Thermal Striping M  H   H  
Hydrolysis of Graphite        
Fluid Properties M       
Pressure Waves        
Two-Phase Flow H       
 
 
Table 4.4 (f)  PIRT for Reactor Vessel Lower Head 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Heat Capacity of Lower Head and Internals H       
Heat Transfer H       
Cooling by Latent Heat of Vaporization        
 
 
Table 4.4 (g)  PIRT for Intermediate Heat Exchanger and Circulator 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Heat Transfer      H H 
Pressure Drop      H H 
Circulator Characteristics      H H 
 
 
Table 4.4 (h)  PIRT for Co-Generation Mixing Junction 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Thermal Striping      H H 
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Table 4.4 (i)  PIRT for Pressure Boundary 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Water Vapor Partial Pressure H H      
Mass and Energy Loss through Relief Valve H H      
 
 
Table 4.4 (j)  PIRT for Hot/Cold Pipe 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection) M  H M  H M 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection) M   M   M 
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)        
Pipe/Insulator Conduction        
Critical Flow        
Pressure Waves        
 
 
Table 4.4 (k)  PIRT for RCCS (Reactor Cavity Cooling System) Reactor Cavity 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Flow Distribution  H   H   
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)  H   H   
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)  M   M   
Radiation Heat Transfer  H   H   
Gas Conduction  H   M   
Conduction to Ground  H   M   
Dust from Core  M      
Air Purge and Gas Species Distribution  H      
Confinement Valve and Filter Characteristics  H      
Pressure Waves        
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Table 4.4 (l)  PIRT for RCCS Tube (Air Duct) 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Heat Transfer (Forced Convection)  H   H   
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)  H   H   
Pressure Drop (Forced Convection)  H   H   
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)  H   H   
Radiation Heat Transfer  H   H   
Fluid Properties (humidity)  M   M   
 
 
 
Table 4.4 (m)   PIRT for RCCS Piping and Chimney 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Heat Transfer (Mixed and Free Convection)  M   M   
Pressure Drop (Mixed and Free Convection)  H   H   
Flow Mixing in Piping Plenums  M   M   
Buoyancy Flow in Chimney  H   H   
Pressure Waves  M   M   
 
Table 4.4 (n)  PIRT for Power Conversion Unit 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Turbine Performance H  H H  H H 
Turbine Valve Performance H  H H  H H 
Heat Conduction in Thick-Walled Structure   H     
Heat Transfer in Coolers M  H   H  
Pressure Drop in Coolers M  H   H  
Water Vapor Condensation in Coolers H       
Heat Transfer in Recuperator   H   H  
Pressure Drop in Recuperator M  H   H  
Compressor Performance H  H H  H H 
Pressure Waves        
Entrainment of Condensed Water H       
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Table 4.4 (o)  PIRT for Shutdown Cooling System 
Water 
Ingress 
Rod Withdrawal 
ATWS 
H2 Plant 
Upset Phenomena 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Tube Leak Flow Regime H H      
Back Pressure in Water Cooling Circuit H H      
Circulator Performance H H  H H  H 
Heat Exchanger Performance    H H  H 
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5.0 Core Flow Modeling and Sensitivity Calculations  
 
Long-term fuel integrity and efficient utilization of fuel thermal capability require 
careful control of coolant temperatures in the core. Since temperatures are a function of 
the distribution of coolant, uncertainty in core cooling distribution leads to uncertainty in 
peak fuel temperature and has as a direct consequence, either a design-based derating of 
the core or, potentially, an increase in the fraction of fuel microspheres that fail during 
upset conditions. Further, precise prediction of coolant allocation permits a more uniform 
core radial temperature distribution to be achieved thereby minimizing temperature-
gradient induced long-term deformation of the graphite elements. Such deformation leads 
to coolant misallocation over life further compounding the adverse dependence of coolant 
viscosity on temperature and its effect on coolant distribution. 
 
5.1 PMR Core Flow Distribution Study 
 
One of the largest uncertainties associated with managing PMR core temperatures 
is that fraction of coolant that bypasses fueled regions by way of leakage paths.  Basic to 
a proper accounting of the long-term effects of coolant leakage on core temperature 
distribution is the need for fundamental data and understanding of the deformation 
behavior of graphite in sustained temperature and neutron fields. Experimental results for 
graphite deformation are needed for development and calibration of models for predicting 
geometry change over life. These models are to provide input to thermal-hydraulics codes 
needed for reliable prediction and control of core coolant distribution through life. 
Knowing the sensitivity of flow through the various leakage paths due to local graphite 
deformation can serve as a guide to selection of experiments. 
 
 For the case of the PMR, the major potential parallel flows to the downward axial 
flow through the coolant holes in the core fuel blocks are: (a) the holes in the core blocks 
designed for the control rods, (b) the flow between the blocks in a column stack.  
Surfaces are not perfectly smooth.  At BOL, there is manufacturing finish to consider, 
and over life, deformation due to irradiation swelling and thermal cycling.  Wedge-
shaped gaps between the top and bottom faces of the graphite blocks have been included 
in leakage studies; and (c) without appropriate design seals, the inter-column gap would 
also be a major bypass leakage flow path for the core coolant.  For the HTTR, wedge-
type seals have been considered for sealing applications at the core support structure.  
The leakage through these seals specifically developed by the designers to be placed in 
the inter-column gaps (between the columns) then constitutes the bypass flow in this gap 
region. 
 
Given this flow geometry, the major factors in determining the core leakage flow 
are: (i) the geometry resistances to the flow through the control rod holes, (ii) design seal 
behavior in the column-to-column gaps at the core support interface, (iii) block-to-block 
stacking surface fit, and (iv) column-to-column gap history during core life.    The 
sensitivity (perturbation) calculations presented in this section evaluate these factors. 
 
In summary, the results of the sensitivity calculations presented in this section 
show that the greatest sensitivity is presented by factor (ii), the behavior of the design 
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seal at the core support structure.  Next in importance is factor (iii) for block elements at 
the core periphery.  The other factors are much less significant in comparison to these 
two.  Details follow below.   
 
5.1.1 Core Layout and Coolant Allocation  
 
In addition to providing for the removal of the heat of fission in the active region 
of the core in a safe and efficient manner, provision must also be made for cooling of 
reflector regions and control assemblies in the core. The layout of these regions in the 
GT-MHR design is shown in Fig. 5.1. There are four types of elements that make up the 
core: the fuel element shown in Fig. 5.2, the fuel control element (reserve shutdown and 
startup) shown in Fig. 5.3, reflector control element shown in Fig. 5.4, and the solid 
reflector element. A main design task is to apportion the available coolant among these 
different element types in the most efficient manner, which essentially amounts to 
ensuring no element is overcooled. An element will be overcooled when it receives more 
coolant than needed to ensure structural integrity over life. At a particular lattice position 
the column is composed of stacked elements all of the same type. 
 
A major design decision is to choose between orificing zones to control coolant 
allocation among regions or relying on power-profile management. In the former case, 
flow restrictions built into each column of elements throttle flow so that each column  is 
optimally cooled. In the latter case, the flux shape is managed over time so that the local 
power production results in optimal temperatures in a column. The flow through the 
column is a function of the geometry of the element that makes up a column. To manage 
this flow the designer has some flexibility in choosing the number and diameter of 
cooling channels that run the vertical length of an element. Disadvantages associated with 
coolant allocation by orificing include the possibility of misplaced fuel elements, 
cracking of fuel elements by lateral pressure gradients, and increased loop pressure drop. 
The latter adversely impacts Brayton cycle efficiency in direct cycle plants. 
Disadvantages of power-profile management include the potential need for greater fuel 
element shuffling to achieve a core temperature distribution comparable to that 
achievable by orificing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1  GT-MR Core Layout 
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Fig. 5.2  Fuel Element 
 
Fig. 5.3  Fuel Control Element 
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Fig. 5.4  Reflector Control Element 
 
Core temperature control by power-profile management rather than orificing 
appears to be the current trend in gas reactor design. [5.1,5.2] Means of controlling the 
power distribution in the core include fuel element shuffling as a function of burnup, 
multiple enrichment zones, burnable poisons, and control rod power shaping. With the 
shuffling of fuel elements the possibility for power-to-flow mismatches exists. However, 
there are a number of means for detecting the consequences of a misplaced element 
including column exit thermocouples, monitoring for fission product release, detecting 
local flux perturbations, and element specific gas tagging. In this work, we assume 
power-profile management. 
 
5.1.2  Phenomena Giving Rise to Leakage and Its Uncertainty 
 
The most important effect leading to uncertainty in core coolant flow distribution 
appears to be uncertainty associated with dimensions of coolant flow paths. These can 
take the form of manufacturing tolerances and result in leakage sites where the leakage 
flow is not well characterized. Part of the problem is that graphite structures that interface 
to one another often involve a dry fit where the only engineered force constraining the fit 
is gravity. Stacked elements are an example. The gap size between two stacked elements 
depends on the tolerances the two faces have been machined to and local asperities 
related to surface finish. The elements in turn are subject to somewhat random forces (but 
of limited magnitude) exerted by neighboring elements with only the force of gravity 
serving as the engineered force to constrain the position of an element. While there may 
be a core restraint system, it typically constrains through periphery columns so the 
behavior of interior columns is subject to local inter-column gaps that has a component 
that depends only weakly on the core restraint system.[5.3] Another instance is the 
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graphite seal where an inter-column gap meets the core support blocks.  These seals again 
rely on a dry fit, and their position appears to be constrained only by the weight of 
structures above. These seals are critical for minimizing leakage from these gaps into the 
outlet plenum. 
 
The uncertainty in the dimensions of coolant flow paths can also take the form of 
uncertainty arising with the long-term distortion of core components. Such changes are 
pronounced at locations where there is a steep gradient in the temperature or neutron 
fluence with respect to position. A change in geometry can create leakage paths that 
reroute coolant that would otherwise pass through the core. Specific instances include 
geometry change in the stacked elements and gap seals cited above.  Other instances are 
life-cycle induced cracks in elements and changes in flow area where control assemblies 
penetrate control rod holes in fuel control elements. Uncertainty in the prediction of 
dimensions has two components. First is that associated with the analytical methods for 
predicting the local fluence and temperature field. Second is the deformation response of 
the material. This depends on the properties of the graphite which in turn strongly depend 
on the specific blend of carbon used and the preparation method employed.[5.4] The 
literature suggests good properties characterization of the specific graphite used is a 
requirement for good analytic prediction of deformation response. Also under material 
properties is porosity. Coolant flowrate from coolant channels to inter-column gaps 
through pores in the graphite is a function of the material porosity. 
 
The gas reactor literature describes some classic cases of deformation of graphite 
structures that lead to coolant leakage. The first is the opening of wedge-shaped gaps 
between stacked elements [5.2,5.5 - 5.8]. This effect is driven by either temperature or 
fluence gradients which give rise to differential thermal expansion and swelling of 
graphite. These gradients are steepest at the core periphery where the last row of fuel 
elements meets the first row of reflector elements. The second is deformation of the core 
support blocks upon which the core columns stand. [5.9 - 5.11]  Openings in these seals 
can cause leakage of coolant from the inter-column gaps into the outlet plenum bypassing 
fuel element coolant channels. 
 
The literature also identifies design approaches for minimizing these deformations 
and their effects. Thermally-induced deformations can be minimized by maintaining a 
flat temperature profile across the core in the radial direction through application of 
power-profile management strategies. [5.1] This same approach can be used to manage 
fluence-induced deformation. To minimize the effect of coolant leakage due to seal 
deformation, one can choose a seal geometry that is inherently less prone to leak with 
deformation of the graphite. An example using wedge-shaped seals is described in [5.11]. 
 
5.1.3  Core as a Two-Dimensional Array of Elements 
 
There are two main spatial dependencies that determine the flow distribution in 
the core. The first is a local dependency, the type of element present at a column position. 
The second is a global dependency, the ordering of element types as one moves radially 
outward across columns starting at the core center and terminating at the outer reflectors. 
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There does not appear to be a strong azimuthal component to the flow conditions in any 
particular column type. These conclusions were drawn as follows. Figure 5.1 shows the 
GT-MHR core layout, also adopted for the NGNP. Column orificing is not used. In this 
core design, a 120 degree symmetry section of active columns is shown in Fig. 5.5. Each 
of the letters A and B denote column refueling where one-half the fuel columns are 
replaced at each refueling. If one examines the upper half of this figure, one sees a 
repetition of two two-dimensional fuel element arrays. A similar type of repetition 
appears in the lower half of Fig. 5.5. We approximate the repetition seen in the upper half 
by the rendering in Fig. 5.6 that shows these two arrays alternating to infinity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.5  Active Core Symmetry Section for GT-MHR 
 
A second premise is that lateral flow interaction between these two adjacent two-
dimensional fuel arrays (shown in bold in Fig. 5.6) can be ignored without significant 
consequence since the interaction is small compared to interaction between columns in 
the radial direction. Columns opposite one another in the two alternating arrays have 
differing powers but there does not appear to be a mechanism whereby this difference can 
significantly affect hydraulics. The channel axial coolant temperature profile will differ 
between opposite columns but this will not appreciably affect the channel pressure drop 
and hence the stacked element interface leakages. The columns are not orificed so the 
frictional resistance in coolant channels between opposite columns will be the same so 
there is no potential for cross-flow leakage between the two arrays. Essentially as we 
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move across these arrays in Fig. 5.6 in what was the azimuthal direction the same type of 
element is encountered. But if we move radially outward we first encounter reflector 
elements, then fueled elements, then reflector elements. The differing flow characteristics 
of each of these element types will give rise to a global flow distribution that has a radial 
dependence, both interior to the elements and in the gaps between elements. This 
dependence will be made stronger by the expected creation of a wedge-shaped gap 
between two stacked elements at locations in the core where fueled elements meet outer 
reflector elements. The gap will arise as a result of the steep temperature and fluence 
gradient there as described earlier. As a consequence, the interaction of flows among 
elements is well approximated by the arrows in Fig. 5.7. Essentially, the hydraulic 
solution for each of the two types of two-dimensional element arrays shown there, and 
the individual solution component flows by element type, can be taken as representative 
for the whole core. 
Fig. 5.6  Idealization of Core as Two Alternating Two-Dimensional Arrays of Elements.  
Unique arrays are identified in bold. 
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Given these alternating arrays of elements whose individual element solution is 
representative of core-wide elements, additional details can be added to reflect features 
not described above. There are variants on the basic reflector and control elements that 
give rise to four types of elements. These are represented in Fig. 5.8 in numbers in 
proportion to their appearance on an average core-wide basis as established in Table 5.1. 
They have also been ordered to reflect the core wide spatial arrangement of such 
assemblies. That is solid reflector elements in the core interior, three successive fuel 
elements with the last having a control rod hole, and finally at the core periphery a solid 
reflector control element with a control rod hole. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.7  Coolant Nodes and Flow Paths for Core Approximated by Two Alternating 
Two-Dimensional Arrays of Elements 
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Fig. 5.8   Top View of Representative Row of Reactor Columns (see Table 5.1) 
 
 
Table 5.1  Basis for Assumed Representative Row of Columns * 
Element Type Fractional Number Number in 
Representative Row 
Fuel Element 72/138= 0.52 2 
Control Fuel Element 
       (Reserve Shutdown and 
        Startup Control Rods) 
30/138=0.22 1 
Reflector Control Element 
       (Operating Control Rods) 
36/138= 0.26 1 
* Data from GT-MHR Design Description, General Atomics, 1996 [5.13] 
 
 
5.1.4  Flow Distribution Model 
 
The distribution of flow among block elements is governed by several important 
phenomena. Provision for representing them has been made in the model we have 
developed. Briefly, these phenomena include: 
• Leakage from the coolant channels interior to two stacked elements 
laterally through the interface gap that separates the two, into the inter-
column gap. 
• Increased lateral leakage for fueled columns at the periphery of the core 
compared to interior columns by means of element-by-element 
specification of pressure loss coefficients. 
• Leakage from the coolant channels interior to two stacked fuel control 
elements through the interface gap that separates the two into the control 
rod hole. 
• Lateral flow between the inter-column gaps of neighboring columns. 
Inner 
Reflector 
Fuel 
Element 
Fuel 
Element 
Control Fuel 
Element 
Reflector 
Control 
Element 
Core Periphery 
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• Either a flow or pressure boundary condition for the coolant channel, gap 
channel, and control-hole channel of each element at both the inlet and 
outlet of the core. 
 
The provision for a flow boundary condition above permits representation of 
control rods at the inlet and seals at the outlet to be represented without explicit 
knowledge of their pressure loss characteristics. This also allows the consequences of 
seal effectiveness to be investigated parametrically. In addition to the phenomena above 
the usual axial Fanning friction losses in coolant, control rod hole, and inter-column gap 
channels are also represented. 
 
The distribution of flow amongst the two-dimensional array of elements is 
represented by a network of interconnected unit block elements. The generic individual 
unit block element is shown in Fig. 5.9 and defines the various flows represented in the 
model. These flows combine and split at various locations in the core as described earlier. 
In the model this is assumed to occur at mass nodes whose locations in the unit block 
elements are shown as solid discs in Fig. 5.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.9  Coolant Paths Through and Around an Element 
 
It is assumed that flow paths couple mass nodes and that each of the flows shown 
in Fig. 5.9 is assumed to exit a node and re-enter a node without interacting with other 
flows.  
 
Conservation of momentum governs the flow in each of these paths balancing 
frictional losses with change in pressure. This is depicted in Fig. 5.11 in a unit flow-
pressure loop network where pressures are defined at the nodes and frictional losses are 
represented by resistances between nodes.  The solid lines indicate where the mass and 
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momentum balances around an element are taken. The network repeats for blocks above 
and below and for blocks to either side. The dashed lines in the figure represent flow 
paths on adjacent unit networks. Figure 5.10 and 5.11 also define the node labeling 
scheme. Index k represents the block axial level and increases in the downward direction 
while index l represents the column number and increases radially outward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  5.10  Coolant Mixing Nodes for Elements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.11  Network Representation of Mass Nodes, Coolants Flowpaths, and Pressures.  
                Unit network denoted by lines and nodes drawn in bold.  
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 This network representation of the PMR core flow distribution model has been 
implemented in the GAS-NET code.  Details of the code are available in Appendix I.  
GAS-NET has been used to perform the PMR sensitivity calculations outlined in the 
following sections. 
 
5.1.5   Base Case 
 
A reference case is defined for the sensitivity calculations. It provides a baseline 
against which the effect of variations in parameters of interest can be compared and 
sensitivities determined. For the reference case, the GT-MHR core is adopted with [5.13] 
serving as the source of basic engineering data. This document was used to identify the 
types of elements present in the core, the dimensions of the elements, and their 
arrangement in the core. This document is also used to determine the geometric details of 
the flow paths that bypass coolant around coolant channels in fueled elements. These 
flowpaths were identified above under the heading Constitutive Equations. Some 
engineering parameters do not have values given in [5.13].  These parameters include the 
inter-column gap thickness at full power operation, the nominal gap thickness of the 
interface between two stacked elements, and the dimensions of the wedge-shaped gap 
that evolves from this over time during operation at power.  Means for estimating their 
values are described below. 
 
For the base case it is assumed the distribution of coolant among the different 
elements in the core is given by the equivalent core representation shown in Fig. 5.7. The 
rationale for this representation was given in Section 5.1.3 under the heading Core as a 
Two-Dimensional Array of Elements.  Each column in Fig.5.8 is assumed to consist of 
ten stacked elements with each element having the same length as in the GT-MHR. The 
definition of the base case is completed by specifying the values for loss coefficients in 
each of the flowpaths in each unit network associated with each element in Fig. 5.8 and 
by specifying the boundary conditions that drive the flow through the network of 
elements that represents Fig. 5.8. 
 
The values for loss coefficients in the base case along with the engineering data 
used to derive these values are given in Tables 5.2 through 5.8. These tables reference the 
equations for loss coefficients presented in Appendix I. The loss coefficient for the axial 
coolant channels in a fuel element and in a control fuel element are given in Table 5.2 
and appear in the coolant channel axial momentum balance of Eq. (I.7).  The loss 
coefficient for flow through a control rod hole is given in Table 5.2a.  The loss coefficient 
for flow down the gap between two adjacent columns on a per element basis is given in 
Table 5.3 and appears in the gap axial momentum balance of Eq. (I.3). The value is based 
on an inter-column gap thickness derived in Table 5.4 for the hot at beginning-of-life 
condition and assumes a value for the cold condition provided by [5.14]. The value 
obtained for the hot condition is very close to that given by General Atomics in Fig. 5.12. 
The loss coefficient for lateral flow through the inter-column gap is given in Table 5.5 
and appears in the gap lateral momentum balance of Eq. (I.4). The calculation is for the 
shaded region in Fig. I.3 which takes in four element faces. 
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Table 5.2  Axial Loss Coefficient for Coolant Channels in a Fuel Element and in a Control 
Fuel Element per Element 
 Fuel Element Control Fuel Element 
Reference Eq. (I.7b) Eq. (I.7b) 
Number of coolant channels, Nchan 102+6=108 86+7=93 
Coolant channel diameter, Dchan (m) 0.625*2.54e-2 0.625*2.54e-2 
Achan = Nchan П/4 Dchan 2 (m2) 2.14e-2 1.84e-2 
Pw-chan = Nchan П Dchan (m) 5.39 4.64 
Dh-chan = 4 Achan / Pw-chan  (m) 1.59e-2 1.59e-2 
Lchan (m) 0.793 0.793 
C, n 0.184, 0.2 0.184, 0.2 
ρ (kg/m3) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 3.3 3.3 
µ (Pa-s) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 45e-06 45e-06 
Kchan , loss coefficient per fuel element per 
Eq. (I.7b) 
437 572 
 
Table 5.2a  Axial Loss Coefficient for Control Rod Hole in a Control Fuel Element and in 
a Control Reflector Element per Element 
Reference Eq. (I.10b) 
Number of coolant channels, Nchan 1 
Coolant channel diameter, Dchan (m) 4.0*2.54e-2 
Acntrl = Nchan П/4 Dchan 2 (m) 8.10e-3 
Pw-cntrl = Nchan П Dchan (m) 0.320 
Dh-cntrl= 4 Achan / Pw-chan  (m) 0.102 
Lcntrl (m) 0.793 
C, n 0.184, 0.2 
ρ (kg/m3) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 3.3 
µ (Pa-s) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 45e-06 
Kcntrl , loss coefficient per control rod hole 
per element per Eq. (I.10b) 
270 
 
Table 5.3  Axial Loss Coefficient for Inter-Column Gap per Element 
Reference see Figure 5.9 and 5.11 and Eq. (I.3b) 
f , column face width (m) 14.171/2/cos 30o *2.54e-02=0.208 
g, inter-column gap width (m) (at temp.) 3.80e-03 (Table 5.7) 
Agap-ax (m) 2.40e-03 
Pw-gap-ax (m) 1.25 
Dh-gap-ax (m) 7.60e-3 
Lax (m) 31.22*2.54e-02=0.793 
C, n 0.184, 0.2 
ρ (kg/m3) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 3.3 
µ (Pa-s) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 45e-06 
Kgap-ax , axial loss coefficient per inter-
column gap per element per Eq. (I.3b) 
5.50e4 
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Table 5.4 Average Inter-Column Gap in Prismatic Core 
Gap at Cold Condition a (m) 0.04*2.54e-02=1.0e-03 
(=0.04 inches) 
Temperature rise (C) 667-21=646 
Vessel Coefficient of Thermal 
Expansion (m/m/C) 
1.5e-05 
Carbon/Graphite Coefficient of 
Thermal Expansion (m/m/C) 
0.3e-05 
Number of Columns along Vessel 
Diameter 
19 
Column Flat-Flat Distance (m) 14.171*2.54e-02=0.360 
Change in Sum of Gap 
Thicknesses along Vessel 
Diameter from Cold-to-Hot (m) 
0.36*19*646*(1.5-
0.3)*e-05= 
0.053 
Change in a Single Average Gap 
(m) 
0.053/19=2.8e-03 
Single Average Gap at Hot 
Condition (m) 
(2.8+1.0)*e-03=3.8e-03 
(=0.150 inches) 
 
 
 
 
Estimate from Thermo-
Physical Properties 
(BOC) 
Sum of Average Gaps at Hot 
Condition along Vessel Diameter 
(m) 
3.8e-03*19=0.072 
(=2.8 inches) 
Sum of Average Gaps at Hot 
Condition along Vessel Diameter  
at BOC (m) 
2.85*2.54e-02=0.074 
(=2.85 inches) 
 
As Reported in Fig. 5.12 
 
Sum of Average Gaps at Hot 
Condition along Vessel Diameter  
at EOC (m) 
3.5 *2.54e-02=0.089 
(3.5 inches)  
a
 General Atomics personal communication, February 2006. 
 
Table 5.5  Lateral Loss Coefficient for Single Inter-Column Gap Between Gap Nodes per 
                Element 
Reference see Figure I.3 and Equation (I.4b  )  
f , column face width (m) 0.208 
g, inter-column gap width (m) (at temp.) 3.80e-03 
Alat (m) 3.00e-3 
Pw-lat (m) 1.59 
Dh-lat (m) 7.60e-3 
Llat (m) 0.208*4 = 0.832 
C, n 0.184, 0.2 
ρ (kg/m3) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 3.3 
µ (Pa-s) @ (485+850)/2 C and 7.0 MPa 45e-06 
Klat, lateral loss coefficient per four inter-
column gaps per element per Eq. (I.4b) 
3.78e4 
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Table 5.6  Leakage Loss Coefficient for Laminar Flow between Exterior Edge Coolant 
Channels and Adjacent Exterior Inter-Column Gaps for Interface between Two Stacked 
Fuel Elements  
Circumference around Six Faces (m) 0.208*6=1.25 
Number of Coolant Channels Adjacent Six Faces 3*6=18 
 
Fuel Element 
Edge Length per Coolant Channel, a (m) 1.25/18=0.069 
Reference  Eq. (6) 
Coolant Channel Center to Face Distance, xc (m) 0.017 a 
Coolant Channel Radius, rc (m) 0.0159 
Gap between Blocks due to Asperities, δ (m) 50.0e-06 b 
α = (xc2-rc2)1/2 (m) 0.0060 
Kinematic Viscosity, υ (m2/s) 13.6e-06 
 
Single Coolant 
Channel Adjacent 
Exterior Face  
Loss Coefficient Per Coolant Channel, K=∆P/w 8.6e07 
Coolant Channels 
Adjacent Three 
Exterior Faces  
Loss Coefficient per Three Faces, K=∆P/w 
     (w=mass flowrate for nine coolant channels 
            adjacent three exterior faces) 
8.6e07/9=9.5e06 
a 
 (14.172-1.282(10))*2.54e-02/2 b Kaburaki, [5] p. 60 
 
 
 
Table 5.7  Leakage Loss Coefficient for Laminar Flow between Interior Coolant Channels 
and Adjacent Interior Control Rod Hole for Interface between Two Stacked Control Fuel 
Elements (see Eq. (28))a 
Circumference around Control Rod Hole (m) 0.319 c 
Number of Coolant Channels Adjacent Hole 6 
 
Control Fuel 
Element Edge Length per Coolant Channel, a (m) 0.319/6=0.0532 
Coolant Channel Center to Hole Edge Distance, xc 
(m) 
14.171/2*0.0254= 
0.180 
Coolant Channel Radius, rc (m) 0.0159 
Gap between Blocks due to Asperities, δ (m) 50.0e-06 b 
α = (xc2-rc2)1/2 (m) 0.179 
Kinematic Viscosity, υ (m2/s) 13.6e-06 
Loss Coefficient Equation Eq. (6) 
 
Single Coolant 
Channel Adjacent 
Interior Control 
Rod Hole  
Loss Coefficient Per Coolant Channel, K=∆P/w 6.51e09 
Coolant Channels 
Adjacent Interior 
Control Rod Hole  
Loss Coefficient per , K=∆P/w 
     (w=mass flowrate for six coolant channels 
            adjacent interior control rod hole) 
6.51e09/6= 
1.09e09 
a
 Assume control rod hole is centered in the fuel element.  b Kaburaki, [5] p. 60 
c
 3.141*4.0*2.54e-2 
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Table 5.8  Leakage Loss Coefficient for Laminar Flow between Interior Control Rod 
Hole and Exterior Inter-Column Gap for Interface between Two Stacked Solid Reflector 
Control Elements (see Eq. (26))a 
Radius of Element (hex approximated as circle) (m) 14.171/2*0.0254= 
0.180 
Reflector Control 
Element 
Radius of Control Rod Hole (m) 0.0508 c  
Gap between Blocks due to Asperities, δ (m) 50.0e-06 b 
Kinematic Viscosity, υ (m2/s) 13.6e-06 
Loss Coefficient Equation Eq. (4) 
Exterior Inter-
Column Gap and 
Interior Control 
Rod Hole Loss Coefficient, K=∆P/w 2.63e08 
a
 Assume control rod hole is centered in the reflector control element.  
b
 Kaburaki, [5.5] p. 60        c 4.0/2.0*2.54e-2 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.12  Gap Widths in GT-MHR Prismatic Core 
 
The remaining three loss coefficients are for leakage flowpaths that connect fuel 
coolant channels with parallel non-fuel coolant channels and thus are important to the 
fraction of core flow that bypasses the active core region. First, at the interface between 
two stacked elements, coolant can leak between the coolant channels in the periphery of 
the element and the inter-column gap that borders the face of the element. Table 5.6 
derives the value of the loss coefficient for three faces of an element from Eq. (I.18). 
Figure I.6 defines the geometry assumed in this expression. These three faces are oriented 
inward in the case of the leak-in loss term in the momentum balance of Eq. (I.5) and 
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outward in the case of the leak-out term in Eq.(I.6). Note that in the GT-MHR design, 
nine three coolant channels border each element face. Second, at the interface between 
two fuel control stacked elements, coolant can leak between the control rod hole and the 
interior coolant channels that border this hole. The value of the loss coefficient is given in 
Table 5.7 and appears in the momentum balance of Eq. (I.9).  Again, Eq. (I.18) and Fig. 
I.6 apply. Note in the GT-MHR design, six coolant channels border the control hole. 
Third, at the interface between two stacked control reflectors, coolant can leak between 
the control rod hole and the outer face edges of the elements. The loss coefficient is given 
in Table 5.8 and appears in the momentum balance of Eq. (I.9). The value is based on Eq. 
(I.6) and the geometry shown in Fig. I.5. Note for accurate assignment of core flow 
distribution, a key requirement is that the cross-sectional area of these three flowpaths be 
known with good precision. For all three loss coefficients, the value for the gap between 
the elements due to asperities is 50x10-6 m. as shown in Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 and as 
given in [5.11] for the Fort St. Vrain Reactor. 
 
While the GT-MHR core dimensions given above imply a coolant distribution for 
an imposed overall core pressure drop between inlet and outlet, we chose to allocate total 
core coolant at beginning of life as follows: fuel coolant channels, 90%; inter-column 
gaps, 8.5%; and control rod holes, 1.5%.  This represents the midpoint between the GT-
MHR conditions in [5.13] and the HTTR conditions in [5.2]. The exact values are 
unimportant since it is the sensitivities of these values to geometry changes that are of 
interest. 
 
These fractional flow splits were obtained by applying a single pressure boundary 
condition across all channels at the core inlet and applying individual flow boundary 
conditions at the outlet of each of the core channels. The flow boundary conditions 
applied appear in Fig. 5.13 at the core outlet. The actual flow split among the three 
channel types is shown in Fig. 5.14. In practice the core coolant distribution follows from 
a pressure drop that is maintained between inlet and outlet plenum. In a second run of the 
code, the loss coefficients at the bottom row of elements (row ten) shown in Fig. 5.13 
were adjusted to bring all channels into an overall pressure drop of 50 KPa, the same 
value as in the GT-MHR. 
 
All perturbed cases assumed as a starting point the Base Case with this 50 KPa 
inlet to outlet pressure drop as the imposed boundary condition. In each of the perturbed 
cases, the effect of a change in a dimension in a leakage path was simulated by changing 
the corresponding loss coefficient by an amount that would be induced by such a change. 
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Fig. 5.13  Axial and Lateral Coolant Flowrates (kg/s) for Base Case. Pressure boundary 
condition at core inlet; flow boundary condition at outlet of each channel. Loss 
coefficients defined between channel outlets and outlet plenum provide for 50 KPa 
overall pressure drop. Columns are ten elements high. Dashed arrow is flow internal to 
element. Not shown: control rod hole flow in fuel control and reflector control elements.
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Fig. 5.14 Axial Coolant Flow Distribution for Base Case 
 
5.1.6   Perturbed Cases 
 
The base case establishes a core flow distribution at nominal conditions and 
serves as a reference against which the results of perturbing a parameter in a leakage path 
can be compared. The consequence of the perturbation is measured in terms of the 
change induced in the axial temperature profile of the coolant in a fuel element. 
 
In practice, the effect of a perturbation in core hydraulics involves establishing a 
new equilibrium for flow around the entire primary system. The new equilibrium will be 
a function of the head to flow curve for the primary system that takes in the 
characteristics of the turbomachines. Since the calculation of flow distribution in this 
section of the report is limited to a pressure boundary condition imposed between the 
inlet and outlet plenum, care must be exercised in interpreting these results and drawing 
conclusions about what they might imply for the behavior of the core in the context of the 
integrated plant. The approach taken is in each perturbed case to adjust the individual 
flows by that factor such that the sum of these adjusted individual flows sums to the total 
core flow in the Base Case. Now since each of the perturbed cases corresponds to a net 
 62 
decrease in core hydraulic resistance compared to the base case, the total primary flow 
will increase. By not taking credit for this increase, the axial temperature profile in a fuel 
element coolant channel for the integrated plant will lie below what we calculate. So the 
sensitivities presented below could be considered an upper bound on what would occur in 
the integrated plant. 
 
The fuel coolant axial temperature in the Base Case as a function of axial length l 
from top to bottom of core is from an energy balance 
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where 
)(lq′   = axial linear power profile in the core, and  
)(lw iBC−  = fuel element coolant flowrate in Base Case in fuel column i  
 
where Ki is a constant such that the outlet temperature in column i satisfies 
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That is, the fuel coolant exit temperatures from fueled columns in the Base Case 
are equal and are elevated above the core average temperature by an amount that takes 
into account the flow that bypasses the fuel columns. The numerator and denominator in 
the above expression are related to one another through 
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where i represents fuel coolant and other represents all axial coolant other than fuel 
coolant i.e. inter-column gaps and control rod holes. 
 
The fuel coolant outlet temperature from column i for perturbed Case k subject to 
the total core flow rate equaling that in the Base Case is then  
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The axial linear power profile adopted for the prismatic core analysis is the ten 
block case shown in Fig. 5.15 which is Fig. 56 of [5.15] edited to show tabular values. 
The fuel coolant temperatures as a function of axial position for the Base Case calculated 
from Eq. (4) are shown in Figure 5.16.  With power-profile management, the temperature 
profiles for the three columns (channels) fall on top of each other.  Table 5.9 summarizes 
the sensitivity results for the fuel coolant channel outlet temperatures for all the cases.   
 
Table 5.9   Sensitivities of Fuel Coolant Channel Outlet Temperature 
 Column 2: 
Fuel Element 
Column 3: 
Fuel Element 
Column 4: 
Fuel Control  
Element 
Base Case 889 889 889 
Case 1:  Leakage Past Control Rod 891 891 891 
Case 2:  Leakage Past Gap Seal at Core 
             Support 
909 909 909 
Case 3:  Wedge-Shaped Opening in 
              Elements at Core  Periphery 
900 900 897 
Case 4:  Opening of Inter-Column Gap 
              Width  
890 890 890 
 
 
Fig. 5.15  Axial Power Profile Adopted as Representative for Prismatic Core 
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Fig. 5.16  Fuel Coolant Temperatures as a Function of Axial Position: Base Case. 
Columns 2 through 4 shown. Radial power profile selected via constant Ki to give same 
temperature at outlet of the three columns. 
 
Case 1: Geometry Resistance to Control Rod Hole Flow 
 
In the Base Case, a small fraction of the reactor coolant passes through the control 
hole in each of columns 4 and 5 as seen in Fig. 5.14. The friction pressure drop is several 
orders of magnitude smaller than the overall core pressure drop. The residual pressure 
was distributed so that one half occurred over the length of the hole in the top element 
and the other half over the length of the hole in the bottom element. The former 
represents the blocking of the control hole by the control rod and the latter the effect of 
the seals at the bottom of the control rod hole. This is achieved through the appropriate 
choice of values for loss coefficients in the control hole channel. 
 
To simulate the case of the control rod not present in the control rod hole or, 
equivalently, posing no flow resistance, the upper loss coefficient was set to zero in 
columns 4 and 5. There was essentially no change in lateral flowrates compared to the 
Base Case shown in Fig. 5.13. The axial flowrates expressed as a percentage of reactor 
flowrate are shown in Fig. 5.17. Again, this figure indicates no significant change in 
lateral leakage from the Base Case. The seal at the bottom of the control hole essentially 
limits any large change in the flowrate in the control hole.  The new axial temperatures in 
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the fuel coolant channels are shown in Fig. 5.18.  The results (squares) fall on top of the 
base case (circles). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.17  Axial Coolant Flow Distribution: Case 1 - Leakage Past Control Rod 
 
 
Case 2: Design Seal Behavior in Inter-Column Gap at Core Support 
 
In the Base Case, the coolant at the base of an inter-column gap is assumed 
restricted by a seal for flow through the core support blocks to the outlet plenum. The 
hydraulic behavior of the seal is represented by a loss coefficient in the gap at the bottom 
level of the core. This loss coefficient raises the total pressure loss for the gap flow up to 
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the overall core pressure drop. The axial pressure drop through the seal is about 66% of 
the overall core pressure drop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.18  Fuel Coolant Temperatures as a Function of Axial Position: Case 1 - Leakage 
Past Control Rod. Columns 2 through 4 shown. 
 
 
The failure of this seal was simulated by setting the loss coefficient to a value 
equal to the friction loss coefficient in the gap over the length of one element. This 
change was limited to the gaps associated with columns 4 and 5 to simulate geometry 
distortion at the core periphery. The impact of this change on core flow distribution is 
seen in Fig. 5.19. Compared to the Base Case there is an increase in coolant flow through 
the seal. Some of this flow comes from neighboring column gaps as indicated by the 
general trend of lateral gap flow towards columns 4 and 5. Overall there is an increase in 
flow into the inter-column gaps at the top of the core as the path resistance has been 
reduced. Figure 5.20 shows that the increased gap flow occurs at the expense of fuel 
coolant flow. The new axial temperatures in the fuel coolant channels are shown in Fig. 
5.21.  A noticeable difference can be seen between the base case and Case 2.  There is no 
variation between the three columns for each case.   
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Fig. 5.19 Axial and Lateral Coolant Flowrates (kg/s): Case 2 - Leakage from Inter-Column 
Gap Past Seals at Core Support 
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Fig. 5.20  Axial Coolant Flow Distribution: Case 2 - Leakage from Inter-Column Gap 
Past Seals at Core Support 
 
 
 69 
Fig. 5.21  Fuel Coolant Temperatures as a Function of Axial Position: Case 2 - Leakage 
from Inter-Column Gap Past Seals at Core Support. Base Case Shown as Circles, Case 2 
as squares. 
 
 
Case 3: Block-to-Block Stacking Surface Fit 
 
In the Base Case, the friction pressure drop in the fuel coolant channels is equal to 
the overall core pressure drop, while the friction pressure drop in the gap coolant 
channels is about 33% of the overall core pressure drop. Both these channel types are 
open at the top of the core. There is no significant lateral leakage flow from between 
stacked elements into or from inter-column gaps as Fig. 5.13 for the Base Case shows. 
 
The effect of a wedge-shaped opening of the interface between stacked elements 
at the periphery of the core due to graphite distortion was examined. The outboard 
leakage coefficients in columns 4 and 5 for both fuel coolant and control hole coolant 
were decreased by a factor of 100 over the entire axial length of these columns. This 
corresponds to an increase in interface gap size of 4.6. Because of the large pressure drop 
through the seals at the base of the inter-column gap in the Base Case, there is a pressure 
differential between fuel coolant channel and gap channel that increases with decreasing 
axial elevation. This differential drives coolant from the gaps into the fuel coolant 
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channels.  Opening the inter-element gap reduces the resistance. As a consequence at the 
bottom of the core there is increased flow from gaps into the fuel coolant channels. One 
sees in Fig. 5.22 the increased fuel coolant axial flow in column 4 and the decreasing gap 
axial flow in neighboring column gaps as the core outlet is approached. Significant gap 
lateral flow in the direction of column 4 is generated across the core as the gap flow sees 
the reduced path of resistance thorough the fuel coolant channels to the core exit. Figure 
5.23 shows the axial behavior after combining flows for fuel channels and for gap 
channels. One also sees that the control holes at the core midplane serve as an alternate 
route for former gap coolant to make its way to the core outlet via the fuel coolant 
channels at the bottom of the core. The new axial temperatures in the fuel coolant 
channels are shown in Fig. 5.24.  There is some variation between the results for the three 
fuel columns (squares) and the base case (circles). 
 
Case 4:  Inter-Column Gap History at Core Periphery 
 
An opening of the inter-column gap along the entire axial length of the core 
creates a reduced resistance path for core coolant causing an increase in the fraction of 
flow that bypasses fuel coolant channels. Figure 5.12 shows roughly a ten percent 
increase in inter-column gap size in going from beginning of life to end of life.  This 
corresponds to a 21 percent decrease in the axial friction loss coefficient in the gap based 
on Eq. (I.13). 
 
To simulate the effect of a ten percent increase in the gap size throughout the core 
over life, the gap axial pressure loss coefficient was reduced by 21 percent compared to 
the base case for columns 1 through 5. The consequence for fuel coolant flow versus gap 
flow appears in Fig. 5.25. Essentially the large pressure drop through the seals at the base 
of the gaps dominates the change in gap axial flow resistance.  There is a reduction in 
fuel coolant flowrate, but it is relatively small. As a result, the new axial temperatures in 
the fuel coolant channels essentially overlay the Base Case when plotted against the data 
in Fig. 5.16. 
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Fig. 5.22  Axial and Lateral Coolant Flowrates (kg/s): Case 3 – Wedge-Shaped Opening 
in Stacked Element at Core Periphery 
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Fig. 5.23 Axial Coolant Flow Distribution: Case 3 - Wedge-Shaped Opening in Stacked 
Element at Core Periphery 
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Fig. 5.24  Fuel Coolant Temperatures as a Function of Axial Position: Case 3 - Wedge-
Shaped Opening in Stacked Element at Core Periphery, Base Case Shown as Circles, Case 
3 as Squares. 
 
Fig. 5.25  Axial Coolant Flow Distribution: Case 4 - Opening of Inter-Column Gap Width 
at Core Periphery 
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5.2  PBR Core Flow Distribution Study 
 
During the development of the PIRTs for pebble bed reactor cores, questions were 
consistently raised about the difficulty in assessing peak fuel temperatures in pebble bed 
systems as a consequence of the uncertainty associated with the core configuration and 
the distribution of coolant flow within the bed.  The assessment of the peak temperature 
in the pebble bed core relies on three individual predicted quantities: the volumetric rate 
of power generation in the hottest pebble in the bed, the rate of flow of coolant over the 
surface of that pebble and the heat transfer coefficient associated with that rate of flow 
and the pebble bed configuration.  The current assessment is focused only on the 
identification of thermal hydraulic modeling capability and needs, so it is assumed that 
suitable core neutronics analyses can be completed to provide a prediction of the peak 
rate of power generation with acceptable accuracy.  The work summarized herein 
provides an initial assessment of the sensitivity of predictions of the core thermal 
hydraulic characteristics to the uncertainty in the pebble size and pebble coolant void 
distribution for assessment of steady state reactor performance. Experimentally derived 
correlations, taken from the open literature, for the pressure loss coefficient and the heat 
transfer coefficient provide a basis for this assessment.  Future assessments will consider 
the additional parameter space needed for transient assessments, including radiation, 
conduction and natural convection heat transfer within the bed and the solid graphite 
moderator. 
 
5.2.1 Assumed Pebble Bed Characteristics and Dimensions 
 
As stated in the introduction, a candidate design for a potential pebble bed reactor 
concept has not yet been identified.  However, in the assessment of the impacts of 
uncertainty in design parameters, it is often necessary to identify a design baseline in 
order to assess deviations from baseline system performance as a consequence of specific 
uncertainties.  For the purpose of these analyses, a 600 MWth reactor with a core outlet 
coolant temperature of 900 ºC and a core temperature rise of 400 ºC is assumed.  The 
reactor core is assumed to have an annular design with a solid graphite outer moderator 
surrounding the core and a cylindrical solid graphite moderator at the center of the core.  
The outer diameter of the fueled region is assumed to be 3.5 m, and the inner diameter of 
the fueled region is assumed to be 1.75 m. The active core region is assumed to have a 
height of 8.5 m [5.16].  The fueled region is assumed to contain a fixed bed of fuel 
pebbles with an outer diameter of 6.0 cm.  Assumed geometric quantities are summarized 
in Table 5.10. 
 
For the purpose of these studies, the bypass flow through the gaps in the 
moderator blocks is neglected, and it is assumed that the assessments completed for the 
Prismatic Cores in the previous section is directly applicable in those regions.  It is 
expected that the uncertainty related to the distribution of pebbles within the bed is more 
significant than the bypass flow, and geometric assumptions have been made to allow a 
preliminary study to be completed without detailed design information.  A more rigorous 
assessment of the impact of bypass flow through the moderator assemblies versus the 
impact of the uncertainties in the pebble bed itself requires a more detailed baseline 
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design to be defined and can easily be completed using the procedures outlined in this 
report when such design data is available.  
 
Table 5.10  Assumed Pebble Reactor Core Parameters 
Quantity Notation Unit
s 
Value 
Reactor Thermal Power Ptot MW 600 
Pebble Diameter dp cm 6.0 
Core Outer Diameter do,c m 3.5 
Core Inner Diameter di,c m 1.75 
Core Height H m 8.5 
Core Outlet Temperature To,c ºC 900 
Core Inlet Temperature Ti,c ºC 500 
 
 
In addition to the geometric description of the reactor core, thermophysical data is 
needed in order to calculate key non-dimensional quantities, such as the Reynolds 
number, needed to evaluate the applicability of experimentally derived correlations as 
well as the sensitivity of those correlations’ predictions to uncertainties in the core 
geometric data.  The primary system coolant is assumed to be helium at a pressure of 7 
MPa.  The thermophysical properties in Table 5.11 [5.17] calculated at this pressure and 
at a core midpoint temperature of 700 ºC are used in all analyses presented herein.   
 
Table 5.11.  Assumed Helium Thermophysical Properties. 
Quantity Notation Units Value 
Density Ρ
 
kg/m3
 
3.435 
Specific Heat cp kJ/kg-ºC 5.190 
Dynamic Viscosity Μ
 
Pa-s 4.534 x 10-5 
Conductivity K W/m-ºC 0.357 
Mean Coolant Temperature T  ºC 700 
 
 Using these parameters, an open bed Reynolds number can be calculated.  Since 
the local mass flow rate within the bed is expected to be a strong function of the pebble 
packing density, correlations for related parameters are typically presented as functions of 
the open bed Reynolds number, Re, which is a function of the velocity of coolant through 
the bed with all pebbles removed.  The pebble Reynolds number, Rep, remains a more 
useful measure of turbulence and heat transfer characteristics of a single pebble, the 
calculation of the pebble Reynolds number requires not only knowledge of the pebble 
diameter but also the local coolant velocity within the pebble bed.  Since these 
parameters are not normally known for a pebble bed system, the open bed Reynolds 
number provides a more useful engineering quantity.  For the assumed baseline pebble 
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bed, the open bed Reynolds number is approximately 1.5 million.  Additional calculated 
parameters for the baseline pebble bed reactor considered are shown in Table 5.12. 
 
5.2.2 Prediction of Pebble Bed Mass Flows and Local Velocities 
 
The accurate prediction of the local flow velocities or mass flow rates within the 
pebble bed is tied to the accurate prediction of the bed pressure loss coefficient.  For 
conventional pressure loss coefficient correlations to be applicable, the diameter of the 
pebbles must generally be significantly smaller than the effective diameter of the reactor 
core, which is consistent with the nominal pebble bed concept.  Furthermore, the pebbles 
must be of uniform size and uniformly distributed within the core for the simplest 
correlations to be applied.  While the diameter and distribution of the pebbles are likely to 
be subject to significant uncertainty in a real system and these correlations should not be 
expected to provide an accurate prediction of the local thermal hydraulic characteristics 
within the three-dimensional core, the application of correlations based upon these 
assumptions does provide a means of bounding the expected values for the core pressure 
drop or mass flow as well as the impact of local uncertainties in geometric configuration. 
 
Table 5.12    Calculated Pebble Bed Thermal Hydraulic Quantities 
Quantity Notation Formula Units Value 
Core Temperature Rise ∆Tc Tout - Tin ºC  400 
Core Cross Sectional Area Axs,c ( )2c,i2 c,o dd4 −pi  m2 7.216 
Core Wetted Perimeter Pw,c ( )c,ic,o dd +pi  m 16.49 
Core Hydraulic Diameter dh,c 4Axs,c / Pw,c m 1.75 
Core Mass Flow mc Ptot / cp∆Tc kg/s 289 
Open Bed Velocity uc m/ ρAxs,c m/s 11.65 
Open Bed Reynolds Number Rec ρucdh,c / µ  1.5 x 106 
Helium Prandtl Number Pr cpµ/k  0.659 
 
   
5.2.2.1 Standard Correlations for Pressure Drop 
 
With the assumptions and constraints described, the pressure drop associated with 
a porous bed can be calculated as a function of the pebble diameter, DP, and packing 
fraction, ε, using the well-known equation of Ergun  [5.18]   
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and the Reynolds number, Rep, is calculated as 
 
µ
ρ pc
p
du
=Re .    (8) 
 
The quantity Rep/(1-ε) is shown as a function of the packing fraction, ε, in Fig. 
5.26.  The quantity Rec/(1-ε) is also shown for comparison.  In the development of the 
Ergun equation, it is assumed that its applicability is limited to the range of 
0 ≤ Rep ≤ 2500.  However, studies at higher Reynolds number, notably the work of 
Achenbach [5.19], have shown that the dimensionless pressure loss coefficient 
approaches a constant value for Rec/(1-ε)≥5x105. For this reason, the Ergun formulation 
is often applied at higher Reynolds numbers as a baseline prediction.  The Ergun equation 
was also developed for 0.4 ≤ ε ≤ 0.6, but is often applied beyond those bounds as a 
baseline for comparison. [5.19]   The Ergun pressure loss coefficient and the resulting 
pressure drop through the baseline pebble bed core are shown in Fig. 5.27, which clearly 
illustrates that the pressure drop and the pressure loss coefficient are related by a simple 
multiplicative constant.  As a consequence, consideration of only the pressure loss 
coefficient is sufficient to assess the impact of geometric and bypass flow uncertainties 
on the predictions of mass transport related quantities. 
 
 
Fig 5.26.  Comparison of Open Bed and Pebble Reynolds Numbers 
Divided by the Quantity (1- ε). Note the Use of Logarithmic Y-Axis to 
Show Detail at Low Void Fractions. 
 
Alternatively, Idelchik [5.20] recommends the slightly more complex equation of 
Bernshtein, et al., where the loss coefficient, λB, is given by 
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and the Reynolds number, ReB, is calculated as 
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pB Re
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The applicability of the Bernshtein correlation is limited to the range 0 ≤ ReB ≤ 
104 and the range 0.4 ≤ ReB ≤ 0.6.  The value of ReB is compared with the value of Rec as 
a function of ε in Fig. 5.28. 
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Fig. 5.27.  Pressure Loss Coefficient Predicted by Ergun Correlation for a 
Reynolds Number of 1.5 x 106. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.28.  Comparison of Open Bed and Pebble Reynolds Numbers 
Divided by the Quantity (1- ε).  Note the Use of Logarithmic Y-Axis to 
Show Detail at Low Void Fractions. 
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Achenbach [5.21] recommends a modified Ergun equation that is more consistent 
with the experimentally observed asymptotic approach to a constant value at high 
Reynolds numbers (Rec up to 5x105), where the loss coefficient, λA, is given by 
 
( ) ( )( ) 4.1Re
20
1Re
32075.1
εε
λ
−
+
−
+=
cc
A .     (11) 
 
The Achenbach equation is valid for Reynolds numbers in the range 250≤ Rec ≤ 
5x105 and void fractions in the range 0.3≤ ε ≤ 0.8 The pressure loss coefficients 
calculated using the Ergun, Bernshtein and Achenbach correlations are shown as a 
function of bed void fraction in Fig. 5.29.  While the predictions of the three correlations 
converge to the same value for high void fractions there is significant deviation at low 
void fractions.  However, it should be noted that a tetrahedral packed bed provides the 
maximum possible bed density or minimum possible void fraction, with a void fraction of 
approximately 0.3336. 
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Fig. 5.29.  Comparison of Pressure Loss Coefficient Predictions Using 
the Ergun, Bernshtein and Achenbach Correlations for a Reynolds 
Number of 1.5 x 106. 
 
The Ergun equation provides the basic form for most other applicable pressure 
drop correlations.  Eisfeld and Schnitzlein, in their extensive review and comparison of 
correlations from the literature with more than 2000 experimental data points found that 
the modified Ergun equations, such as those of Bernshtein and Achenbach, provide only 
small improvements to the accuracy of equations of this type.  Most notably, these 
equations do not account for the effect of the walls that bound the pebble bed on the 
pressure loss coefficient. [5.22]   
 
Eisfeld and Schnitzlein point out the two counteracting effects near the walls – the 
flow rate near the walls increases as a consequence of the higher void fraction in that 
region, but at the same time the friction at the wall reduces the velocity to zero.  
According to the boundary layer theory proposed by Eisfeld, the wall friction is expected 
to dominate at low Reynolds numbers and the voidage effect is expected to dominate at 
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high Reynolds numbers where the boundary layer thickness is reduced.  Furthermore, the 
effects of the wall more strongly affect the pressure drop when the ratio of the core 
hydraulic diameter to the pebble diameter approaches 1.  
 
To better approximate the effects of the bounding wall on the pebble bed pressure 
drop, Eisfeld and Schnitzlein [5.22] propose a modification of the correlation of Reichelt, 
which has the form  
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where the wall correction terms are given by 
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In the modified form, Eisfeld and Schnitzlein fit the empirical coefficients K1, k1, 
and k2 to the extensive database collected in their study, arriving at values of 154, 1.15, 
and 0.87, respectively, for packed beds of spheres.  The predicted pressure loss 
coefficient using the equation of Eisfeld and Schnitzlein is shown in comparison to the 
Ergun-type equations in Figure 5.30.  While the current study does not provide an 
opportunity to assess the accuracy of the predictions, it should be noted that the Ergun 
and Bernshtein correlations bound the two other formulations presently considered.  
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Fig. 5.30  Comparison of Pressure Loss Coefficient Predictions Using the Wall 
Correction Model of Eisenfeld and Schnitzlein with Predictions Using Correlations of the 
Ergun Type for a Reynolds Number of 1.5 x 106. 
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Others have proposed more rigorous approaches to the analysis of the effects of 
the bounding walls.  One notable example is the work of Sodré and Parise, which offers a 
correction to the velocity terms in the Ergun formulation. [5.23]  In general, these more 
rigorous approaches are limited to laminar flows with values of Re/(1-ε) ≤ 2000 and the 
applicability of these methods to the highly turbulent flows expected in the pebble bed 
core is unknown.  These more advanced models may be applicable during the natural 
convection phases of transients to be considered in future analyses. 
 
5.2.2.2 Sensitivity Assessments for Prediction of Pebble Bed Pressure Loss Coefficient 
 
In these studies, the uncertainty in the pressure drop is assumed to be a 
consequence of uncertainties in the pebble bed geometry, including the diameter of the 
pebble, the bed void fraction, the outer diameter of the annular bed, and the inner 
diameter of the annular bed.  The sensitivities of the pressure loss coefficient were 
calculated using the Ergun and Bernshtein correlations for changes in pebble diameter 
and void fraction as well as for changes in the inner and outer core diameters. The 
sensitivities of the predicted pressure drop to changes in the four geometric parameters 
are shown for the Ergun equation in Fig. 5.31 and for the Bernshtein equation in Fig. 
5.32.  
 
For both models, the predicted pressure drop is an inverse power function of the 
pebble bed diameter and a fourth order polynomial function of the pebble bed void 
fraction.  The predicted pressure drop is also a fourth order polynomial function of the 
core inner and outer diameter.  Since the expected fractional error in the void fraction is 
much larger than the expected fractional error in the core dimensions, reasonable errors in 
the prediction of the pebble bed void fraction have the most significant impact on the 
calculated effective Reynolds number for both formulations. It should also be noted that 
the pressure drops predicted by the Bernshtein equation are a factor of two larger than the 
pressure drops predicted by the Ergun equation and that uncertainties associated with the 
correlations themselves may be larger than the uncertainties associated with errors in 
determination of geometric parameters.   
 
To allow a more rigorous assessment of the sensitivity of the pressure loss 
coefficient prediction to uncertainty in the pebble bed void fraction, Achenbach proposed 
that the pressure loss coefficient, λ , could be represented by the asymptotic function  
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where n is a function of Rec such that 
n=1  for  Rec→0 
n=0 for Rec→∞  
 
Therefore, the relative variation of the pressure loss coefficient can be evaluated as a 
function of the relative variation of the void fraction by 
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as shown in Fig. 5.33.  As an example, this relationship indicates that for a randomly 
packed bed of spherical pebbles with an average void fraction of 0.5, an error in the 
prediction of the bed void fraction results in an error in the prediction of the pressure loss 
coefficient which is 4 times larger. 
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Fig. 5.31.   Sensitivity of Pressure Drop Predictions Using the Ergun 
Correlation to Uncertainty in (a) Pebble Diameter and Void Fraction and 
(b) Core Inner and Outer Diameters. 
 
Achenbach extended this approach to consider the limiting cases of the relative 
variation in the mass flow rate (Rec→0 and Rec→∞) which can be calculated as a 
function of the relative variation of the void fraction by 
 83 
 
( )
( )( ) ε
ε
ε
ε ∂
−−
−−
=
∂
12
23
n
n
m
m


,       (17) 
 
As shown in Fig. 5.34, as an example, this relationship indicates that for a 
randomly packed bed with a density of 0.5, an error in the predicted pebble bed void 
fraction results in an error in the predicted mass flow rate that is twice as large for high 
Reynolds numbers and as much as 5 times as large for low Reynolds numbers. 
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Fig. 5.32.  Sensitivity of Pressure Drop Predictions Using the Bernshtein 
Correlation to Uncertainty in (a) Pebble Diameter and Void Fraction and 
(b) Core Inner and Outer Diameters. 
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Fig. 5.33.  Relative Sensitivity of the Pressure Loss Coefficient to 
Variation in Pebble Bed Void Fraction. 
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Fig. 5.34.  Relative Sensitivity of the Mass Flow Rate to Variation in 
Pebble Bed Void Fraction. 
 
In these studies, Achenbach’s approach has been further extended to include the 
analysis of the effects of uncertainty in pebble and core dimensions. In order to fully 
account for the effects of these geometric parameters, the pebble bed void fraction must 
be assumed to be a function of the pebble diameter, dp, and the core hydraulic diameter, 
dh,c, of the form 
 
2
,








+=
ch
p
d
d
CBε ,        (18) 
which follows the form recommended by Achenbach based on the data of Carman. [5.24]  
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The relative uncertainty in the pressure loss coefficient as a consequence of 
uncertainty in the pebble diameter can be evaluated by 
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If the constants C, B, and n are taken from the recommendation of Achenbach, 
[5.24] where  
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then the ratio of the relative error in the pressure loss coefficient as a consequence of the 
relative error in the pebble diameter falls between the bounding curves shown in Fig. 
5.35.  Based on these limiting values, the relative variation in the pressure loss coefficient 
for an expected pebble diameter of 6.0 cm is on the same order of the relative variation in 
the pebble diameter for very low Reynolds numbers and approaches zero as Reynolds 
number increases.  Based on this analysis, the relative uncertainty in the pebble bed void 
fraction has a much larger impact on the relative uncertainty in the pressure loss 
coefficient, but the uncertainty in the pebble diameter cannot be neglected if that 
uncertainty is large and the Reynolds numbers are relatively low. 
 
The choice of B and C in the assumed function for the bed void fraction could 
impact the slope of the n=1 curve, however the function is asymptotic to one for positive 
values of C. Negative values of C would require a significant departure from the 
empirical value suggested by Achenbach [5.19] based on the experimental data of 
Carman. 
 
Fig. 5.35.  Relative Sensitivity of the Pressure Loss Coefficient to Variation in 
Pebble Diameter. 
 86 
Using the same approach, with the pebble bed void fraction defined by a function 
of the form 
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the relative uncertainty in the pressure loss coefficient as a consequence  
of uncertainty in the core hydraulic diameter can be evaluated by 
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If Achenbach’s recommended values of B,C, and n are again assumed, then the 
ratio of the relative error in the pressure loss coefficient as a consequence of the relative 
error in the core hydraulic diameter falls between the bounding curves shown in Fig. 
5.36.  Although the n=1 function has a sharp peak at very small core hydraulic diameters, 
the function asymptotically approaches a value of zero for hydraulic diameters in the 
range of interest for pebble bed reactor cores.  Therefore, a relative error in the core 
hydraulic diameter would be expected to produce a negligible relative error in the 
prediction of the pressure loss coefficient.  As a consequence of the asymptotic behavior 
of the function, the selection of values for the constants B and C do not significantly 
impact the ratio of relative variations in the range of hydraulic diameters of interest.    
 
 
Fig. 5.36.  Relative Sensitivity of the Pressure Loss Coefficient to 
Variation in Core Hydraulic Diameter. 
 
5.2.2.3   Summary of Pebble Bed Pressure Loss Coefficient Prediction 
Uncertainties 
 
In these sections, the sensitivity of pebble bed pressure loss coefficient predictions 
has been evaluated for uncertainties related to pebble diameter, pebble bed void fraction, 
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core hydraulic diameter, and choice of model formulation.  The largest uncertainties in 
predictions relate to the uncertainty in the pebble bed void fraction as a consequence of 
the randomly packed nature of the bed. Large uncertainties are also associated with the 
choice of model formulation, regardless of the Reynolds number of the flow.  More 
complex models that account for wall effects may improve accuracy of predictions, but 
results appear to fall within the band of results from simpler infinite bed models.  At low 
values of the Reynolds number, the uncertainty in the pebble radius may be significant, 
but this effect vanishes with increasing Reynolds number.  The uncertainty in the core 
hydraulic diameter would only have a significant impact on pressure loss coefficient 
predictions in pebble bed reactor cores with hydraulic diameters an order of magnitude 
smaller than assumed for the baseline design in this study.  
 
5.2.3 Prediction of Pebble Bed Forced Convective Heat Transfer Coefficients 
 
Accurate predictions of pebble surface temperature, and, hence, pebble centerline 
temperature, require knowledge of the heat generation rate within the pebble and the heat 
transfer coefficient associated with the local geometric configuration and mass flow rate, 
as shown by 
 
Bulksurface Th
qT +
′′
= ,        (23) 
 
where q” is the surface heat flux and h is the heat transfer coefficient.   
 
As in the previous section’s discussion of models of pressure loss coefficients, 
heat transfer coefficient correlations typically require that the diameter of the pebbles be 
significantly smaller than the effective diameter of the reactor core, which is consistent 
with the nominal pebble bed concept.  Furthermore, the pebbles should again be of 
uniform size and uniformly distributed within the core for the simplest correlations to be 
applied.  While the diameter and distribution of the pebbles are likely to be subject to 
significant uncertainty in a real system and these correlations should not be expected to 
provide an accurate prediction of the local thermal hydraulic characteristics within the 
three-dimensional core, the application of correlations based upon these assumptions 
does provide a means of bounding the expected values for the forced convective heat 
transfer coefficient as well as the impact of local uncertainties in geometric configuration. 
  
5.2.3.1  Standard Correlations for Forced Convective Heat Transfer Coefficients in 
 Pebble Beds 
 
With these assumptions and constraints, the convective heat transfer coefficient 
within the porous bed can be calculated using the well known Eckert correlation [5.25] 
for the Nusselt number: 
 
317.0 PrRe8.0 pPk
hdNu == ,       (24) 
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where Rep, is the pebble Reynolds number given by: 
 
µ
ρ P
p
ud
=Re .         (25) 
 
The heat transfer coefficient, h, is simply calculated by 
 
pd
kNuh ⋅= .         (26) 
 
The Eckert equation is generally applicable only in the laminar regime for low 
Reynolds numbers and moderate values of bed void fraction since this formulation does 
not explicitly account for the impact of the void fraction on the heat transfer mechanisms.  
However, this simplistic form, much like Achenbach’s simple power function 
formulation for the pressure loss coefficient, can be useful for the assessment of 
sensitivity of the heat transfer coefficient to uncertainties in other parameters. 
 
The correlation proposed by Gnielinski [5.26] is widely used for analysis of heat 
transfer within pebble bed systems with volumetric heat addition.  The model is an 
extension of the heat transfer equations of a flat plate, and it was first applied to a single 
sphere before further extension to packed beds of spheres.  Indeed the formulation 
assumes that the Nusselt number of a single sphere, Nus, can be related to the Nusselt 
number of the packed bed by an arrangement factor, which is a function of the bed void 
fraction. 
 
( ) sch Nufk
hd
Nu ε== , ,       (27) 
 
where 
 
( ) ( )εε −+= 15.11f .        (28) 
 
The Nusselt number for a single sphere is given by 
 
222 tls NuNuNu ++=        (29) 
 
where the laminar part is given by 
 
2
1
3
1 RePr664.0 





=
εl
Nu  ,       (30) 
 
and the turbulent part is given by 
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The Gnielinski formulation is valid for 2 ≤ Re ≤ 104, for 0.7 ≤ Pr ≤ 104, and for 
0.26 ≤ ε ≤ 0.935, which nearly encompasses the expected bounds of operation for a 
pebble bed reactor core.   The Gnielinski formulation is compared with the Eckert 
correlation as a function of Reynolds number for three different pebble bed void fractions 
in Fig. 5.37.  The two formulations provide comparable predictions for turbulent heat 
transfer (Re>~1000) in densely packed pebble beds (ε ≈ 0.35).  In more open packings or 
at low Reynolds numbers, accounting for the void fraction by using the Gnielinski model 
results in a slightly larger deviation from the simpler Eckert correlation.   
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Fig. 5.37.  Predicted Nusselt Number Using the Eckert and Gnielinski 
Models as a Function of Reynolds Number  
 
5.2.3.2 Sensitivity Assessments for Prediction of Pebble Bed Heat Transfer Coefficient 
 
Assuming that validated equation sets are identified which reduce correlation 
error to near-zero, uncertainty in the prediction of the heat transfer coefficient within the 
pebble bed core will be a consequence of uncertainties in the pebble diameter, the pebble 
bed void fraction, and the flow velocity within the bed, which is directly related to the 
uncertainty in the ability to predict the core pressure drop.  The dependence of the heat 
transfer coefficient, h, on the pebble diameter and the pebble bed void fraction was 
calculated using the correlations of Eckert and Gnielinski.   Results of these calculations 
are shown in Figs. 5.38 and 5.39 respectively.  As one would expect, the impact of 
uncertainty in these parameters is clearly larger when the value of the parameter is small.  
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Fig. 5.38.  Predicted Heat Transfer Coefficient as a Function of Pebble 
Diameter using Correlations of Eckert and Gnielinski (assumed void 
fraction of 0.5). 
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Fig. 5.39.  Predicted Heat Transfer Coefficient as a Function of Pebble 
Bed Void Fraction using Correlations of Eckert and Gnielinski (assumed 
pebble diameter of 6 cm). 
 
 
The more rigorous procedure outlined by Achenbach for the assessment of 
sensitivities in the pressure loss coefficient predictions can be applied to the heat transfer 
coefficient if the simple correlation of Eckert,  
 
317.0 PrRe8.0 pPk
hdNu == ,       (32) 
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is assumed to be applicable.  The relative variance in the heat transfer coefficient as a 
consequence of the relative variation in the pebble diameter is given by 
 
p
p
d
d
h
h ∂
−=
∂ 3.0 .        (33) 
 
Therefore, any relative uncertainty in the pebble diameter can be expected to 
result in a relative uncertainty in the heat transfer coefficient that is three tenths the 
magnitude of the uncertainty in the core mass flux. 
 
The relative variance in the heat transfer coefficient as a consequence of the 
relative variation in the core mass flux, G0 = ρu, is given by 
 
0
07.0
G
G
h
h ∂
=
∂
         (34) 
 
Therefore, any relative uncertainty in the core mass flux results in a relative 
uncertainty in the heat transfer coefficient that is seven tenths the magnitude of the 
uncertainty in the pebble diameter. 
 
Since the Eckert equation does not account for the effect of the pebble bed void 
fraction, the effect of relative variations in that parameter cannot be calculated in this 
fashion.  The more qualitative approach using the Gnielinski correlation as shown in 
Figs. 5.38 and 5.39 must be employed for this assessment.  Based on the results shown in 
Figs. 5.38 and 5.39, the effects of relative variation in pebble bed void fraction appear to 
be more significant than the effects of comparable relative variations in pebble diameter 
or core mass flux. 
 
5.2.3.3  Summary of Pebble Bed Heat Transfer Coefficient Prediction Uncertainties 
 
In these sections, the uncertainty in the prediction of pebble bed heat transfer 
coefficients has been evaluated as a consequence of uncertainties in pebble diameter, core 
mass flux, and pebble bed void fraction.  The effect of choice of model formulation is 
also considered, but is much less severe than for the prediction of the pebble bed pressure 
loss coefficient.  Relative uncertainty in core mass flux is more than twice as significant 
as the relative uncertainty in pebble diameter in the prediction of pebble bed heat transfer 
coefficients.  Although the impact of relative uncertainty in the pebble bed void fraction 
cannot easily be calculated directly, qualitative comparisons of Fig. 5.38 and 5.39 appear 
to indicate that relative uncertainty in the void fraction may be most significant factor in 
the accurate prediction of pebble bed heat transfer coefficients. 
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6.0 Conclusions 
 
To date, a select set of VHTR/NGNP events have been evaluated to identify 
phenomena expected to occur during the transients and that could be of importance to 
model in the thermal-fluid design and safety analyses tools due to their effect on the 
performances and safety consequences.  In FY06 the focus was on water-ingress, a 
control rod withdrawal ATWS and the hydrogen plant side aspect.  This set of sequences 
was chosen to complement those evaluated in FY05: the protected station blackout, the 
large break    depressurization with shutdown and the load change.  These events span the 
normal operating, off-normal to the design-basis and the beyond-design basis spectra.  A 
range of initiators are involved from leaks to loss of electrical power to reactivity 
transients.  Two generic designs, one for a PBR and one for a PMR were considered.  The 
set of phenomena identified from these sequences for inclusion in the modeling needs 
should be quite broad and encompassing.  The range of behavior should include the 
limiting envelope.  However, there remains a need to: 
(i) Consider an indirect cycle plant design and a water-cooled RCCS.  The 
two generic designs which have been utilized in the PIRT development 
have both been direct cycle plant.  Moreover as a first iteration, both 
designs were assumed to utilize an air-cooled RCCS.   
(ii) Pressure upset initiators should be assessed.  Phenomena relating to 
pressure perturbation such as PCU check valve failures or problems in the 
turbo-machinery could selectively broaden the list of modeling needs.  
Another initiator category which would fall into this category are seismic 
initiators.  In particular, this would perhaps produce phenomena relating to 
core reconfigurations.  
(iii) Additional definition to the phenomena matrix outlined in the PIRTs 
would add sub-phenomena with an additional level of detail to the 
modeling needs in the codes.  The phenomena of core flow distribution 
would require a sub-level on the treatment of the core bypass flow in this 
scheme. 
 
Core flow distribution and bypass was identified as an area for that it would be 
beneficial to perform sensitivity studies to assess the various factors that affect the 
magnitude and distribution of this flow.  Modeling development needs have been 
preliminarily determined based on the results of these studies.  The conclusions are 
summarized below. 
 
6.1 PMR Core Flow Distribution Modeling Needs 
 
Based on the calculations presented above, a list can be compiled identifying the 
most important phenomena that contribute to uncertainty in core coolant temperature.   
 
The goal of calculations in this work was to quantify the effect of fuel coolant 
temperature of variation in four key parameters.  The parameters are the leakage 
resistance at the inter-column gap seals at the core support structure, the width of the gap 
between two stacked elements, the leakage resistance past an inserted control rod, and the 
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width of the inter-column gap.  The base case is the GT-MHR core with nominal inter-
column gap flow of 10 percent, control rod hole flow of 1.5 percent, and fuel coolant 
channel flow equal to the balance.  The results show that effectiveness of the inter-
column gap seals at the core support structure has the greatest effect on fuel element 
coolant temperature uncertainty.  This is the most sensitive leakage resistance.  Next in 
importance is the gap size between stacked elements at the core periphery that results in 
an uncertainty about half as great as that for the inter-column gap seals.  For these two 
locations, flow leakage at beginning of life can probably be well characterized through 
laboratory experiments.  The Japanese had an experiment program to do this for the 
HTTR.  In comparison to these two locations, the uncertainty in leakage past control rods 
and uncertainty in inter-column gap thickness result in a fuel coolant temperature 
uncertainty of about an order of magnitude smaller.  
 
The ranking of priorities based on the numerical results in Table 5.9 is 
preliminary as it is dependent upon the base case.  This is certainly designer dependent.    
One may want to investigate the impact of design related choices such as the type of 
graphite, the design of core support seals, layout of coolant holes in graphite elements, 
and flux and temperature distributions across the core on the flow split between fuel 
coolant holes and bypass channels (control rod holes and inter-column gaps) before 
considering the effect of uncertainties. 
 
The sensitivity of fuel coolant temperature to an individual effect is dependent in 
part on the design definition. For example, both the inter-column gap axial flow 
resistance and the leakage resistance of the block seal at the base of the inter-column gap 
are key factors influencing the bypass flowrate. While block seal performance is rated 
most important in this work, increased gap resistance due to gap narrowing would act as 
an upstream seal, diminishing the sensitivity of temperatures to block seal leakage 
resistance. An example of another important factor is the termination of control rod holes 
at the core support. In this work, we assumed these holes terminate blind at the core 
support. If the designer choose otherwise, a significant new path for leakage to the outlet 
plenum exists. Thus, rankings in general are sensitive to the base case definition. Without 
a base case definition that reflects the final core design, the usefulness of rankings is 
diminished. 
 
Furthermore, the correlations used in this study for leakage are based on 
analytical derivations and have their own assumptions. The correlations at issue are those 
used for leakage from a coolant channel to an inter-column gap, from a coolant channel 
to a control rod hole, and from a control rod hole to an inter-column gap. A set of 
experiments is needed to either establish the uncertainty on these correlations or to 
develop new ones highly tuned to the geometric specifics of the graphite elements in the 
final core design. CFD simulation of leakage hydraulics would be useful but only after 
the geometry of the leakage path has been characterized. Since this path depends on the 
mating of ultimately unobservable surfaces, it is difficult to imagine how this geometry 
could be characterized directly. On the other hand, measuring the hydraulic consequences 
through an experiment is straight forward. 
 
 96 
Finally, there is the question of the dimensions of leakage paths in the base case. 
The nominal gap thickness in each of the leakage paths listed above is highly uncertain at 
this time. The thickness depends on how surfaces are prepared, the precision to which 
elements are machined, and the type of graphite and the characteristics of how it deforms 
over life. All these factors influence the mating of inter-element surfaces in a column of 
stacked elements constrained at the top and by nearest neighbors. A potential range of the 
gap thickness between stacked elements comes from [5] where it is noted that the gap 
thickness used for HTTR calculations is a factor of ten smaller than the value given there 
for the Fort St. Vrain Reactor. Additionally, the size of the leakage gaps both for between 
stacked elements and in core support seals is a function of the type of graphite and the 
local flux and temperature gradients. Clearly, these effects must be quantified as to their 
role in coolant bypass uncertainty. 
 
6.2 PBR Core Flow Distribution Modeling Needs 
 
The analyses presented in section 5.2 clearly indicate that accurate knowledge of 
the distribution of pebbles within the pebble bed reactor core in the form of a core 
average void fraction or, preferably, a core void fraction distribution is essential to 
accurately predicting the thermal hydraulic performance of the reactor core during 
normal operating conditions.  An experimental or numerical assessment of the probability 
distribution function describing the pebble void fraction distribution for pebbles 
(appropriately scaled diameter) moving through an annular column (appropriately scaled 
diameter) is needed.  Scaled numerical or physical experiments could potentially be used 
by maintaining the ratio of the pebble diameter to the core hydraulic diameter. 
 
The variation between conventional correlations for pebble bed pressure loss 
coefficients and heat transfer coefficient is significant.  For the pressure drop loss 
coefficient, the effect of the wall is lost in the uncertainty.  Therefore, appropriately 
scaled, instrumented, and documented experimental data is needed to identify and 
validate suitable correlations or, if necessary, develop new system-specific correlations 
for those parameters.  Furthermore, it is expected that within a pebble bed reactor core 
the Reynolds number based on pebble diameter may approach or even exceed a value of 
105, which approaches or surpasses the limit of applicability or at least validation for 
most conventional pebble bed correlations.  Any potential new validation experiments 
completed to support the development of a pebble bed high temperature gas-cooled 
reactor must include data for values of the Reynolds number greater than 105. 
 
All pebble bed correlations assume a uniform distribution of pebbles at some 
constant density within the bed.  In reality, cavitation or bridging may occur within the 
pebble bed as old pebbles are extracted and new pebbles are added.  The effects of these 
granular flow phenomena on thermal hydraulic performance are unquantified.  
Appropriately scaled experimental or numerical assessments of both the probability of 
occurrence and the impact of the development of such regions within the bed on the 
reactor’s thermal hydraulic performance are needed. 
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Finally, the work reported herein considers only the correlations of importance in 
steady state operation.  Future assessments of uncertainty impacts must include the 
correlations important to transient analyses such as natural and mixed convection heat 
transfer coefficients, radiation heat transport and conduction heat transport.   
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Appendix I:  PMR Core Flow Network Representation 
 
I.1 Conservation Equations 
 
The flow network is composed of an array of unit flow networks where the unit 
network represents the flow of conserved quantities around a single block. Since our core 
model is a single row of columns, with each column a stack of blocks, the flow network 
is a two-dimensional construct of linked unit networks. Below we give the conservation 
balances for the unit flow network for the block in column l at axial level k. Presently,  
the model momentum equation accounts for only shear stress pressure drop in a channel. 
Entrance and exit losses and pressure change with coolant acceleration are not included. 
Inclusion of these terms at a later time is a simple matter. Appropriate correlations for 
entrance and exit losses would first need to be identified. 
 
A. Channel Coolant Node Mass Balance 
 
Coolant channel node nodechan l,k shown in Fig. 5.10 situated at the top of the 
block in column l at block axial level k. Performing a mass balance on the flows shown in 
Fig. 5.9 into and out of this node gives 
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outleak
kl
inleak
kl
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where  
 
wchan
l,k
  = flowrate through all the coolant channels in the block, 
wleak-in
l,k
 = leakage flowrate on the inboard side of the interface gap 
between blocks at axial levels k-1 and k in column l, taken 
as a positive quantity when emanating from the coolant 
channels on trasnit to the gap, 
 wleak-out
l,k
 = same as wleak-in
l,k
, but on the outboard side, and 
kl
cntrlleakw
,
−
 = flowrate from coolant channel to control rod hole when 
present. Assumed positive when flow is from the coolant 
hole to the control rod hole.  
 
B. Gap Coolant Node Mass Balance 
 
Gap node nodegap l,k shown in Fig. 5.10 is sitiated on the inboard side of the block 
in column l at block axial level k. Performing a mass balance on the flows shown in Fig. 
5.9 into and out of this node gives 
 
kl
axgap
kl
axgap
kl
outleak
kl
inleak
kl
latgap
kl
latgap
ww
wwww
,1,
,1,,,10
−
−
−
−
−−−
−
−
−+
++−=
    (I.2) 
 
where the mass flowrates are shown in Fig. 5.9 and are defined as 
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wgap-lat
l,k
 =   lateral flow, taken as a positive quantity when leaving the 
gap node, on transit to the next outboard gap node, and 
wgap-ax
l,k 
 =  axial flow, taken as a positive quantity when leaving the 
gap node, on transit to the next gap node below it. This 
flow is assumed to be distributed between the gaps that 
subtend the 90 degree sector that occupies the lower right 
quadrant of block l,k and the 90 degree sector that 
subtends the upper right quadrant of block l-1,k. 
 
C. Inter-Column Gap Coolant Axial Momentum Balance 
 
That component of the coolant that flows axially down the gap between blocks is 
assumed to transit between gap nodes. The flow network diagram in Fig. 5.11 shows 
flowrate wgap-axl,k flowing between nodes nodegap l,k and nodegap l,,k+1. A momentum 
balance between these nodes gives 
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where Aaxl,k and Pw-axl,k are the crossectional area and wetted perimeter, respectively, of 
the participating coolant shown as the shaded region in Fig. I.1 and f and g are defined in 
Fig. I.2. As appears in Fig. I.1, in representing the hydraulics of the coolant in the gaps, 
we have lumped in with it the coolant in the single triangle and the two half triangles 
formed by the vertexes of the blocks that lie at the corners of the rectangular gaps. An 
expression for the ratio of this area to gap area for a unit cell for typical dimensions of g 
= 0.15 in. and f = 14 in. gives the ratio of these areas as 0.003. Thus, the combined fluid 
behaves predominalty as the fluid in the gap. 
 
D. Inter-Column Gap Coolant Lateral Momentum Balance 
 
That component of the coolant that flows laterally in the gap between blocks is 
assumed to transit between gap nodes. The flow network diagram in Fig. 5.11 shows 
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flowrate wgap-latl,k flowing between nodes nodegap l,k and nodegap l+1,k. A momentum 
balance between these nodes gives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. I.1  Coolant Participating in Axial Momentum Balance between Gap Nodes nodegapl,k 
and nodegapl,k+1. Coolant is shown as shaded region.  
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Fig. I.2  Coolant Nodes and Unit Cell 
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where Aaxl,k and Pw-axl,k are the crossectional area and wetted perimeter, respectively, of 
the participating coolant shown as the shaded region in Fig. I.3. Viewed from the side of 
the column, the particpating coolant is assumed to extend from the middle of the block at 
axial level k to the middle of block k-1 where axial levels are defined in Fig. 5.10. The 
length of the channel, Llat, is set equal to the number of block gaps that are passed in 
going from nodes nodegap l,k and nodegap l+1,k. Figure I.3 shows this number to be four. 
Gap Coolant Node 
g 
Unit Cell 
Vertex Coolant Node 
f Block 
Vertex Node to Gap Node Area inside Unit Cell= f
g
32
1
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Fig. I.3  Coolant Participating in Lateral Momentum Balance between Gap Nodes 
nodegapl,k and nodegapl+1,k. Coolant is shown as shaded region. 
 
 
E. Block Interface Coolant Momentum Balance 
 
A momentum balance for the horizontal interface between two stacked blocks is 
taken from the center of the blocks out to the periphery. Two momentum balances are 
written, one for that one-half of the interface area that is on the inboard side and the other 
for the interface area that is on the outboard side, respectively 
 
kl
gap
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   (I.5) 
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We assume positive wleak-inl,k and wleak-outl,k represent flow from the center to the 
periphery. 
 
In these expressions, the form the loss coefficients take depend on whether the 
gap is of uniform thickness as is the case where the blocks have not deformed or whether 
it is wedge-shaped as in the case where the blocks are deformed and inter-block forces 
cause the two stacked blocks to ride on a single edge. In the first case, the relation 
between flowrate and frictional pressure drop is given by Eq. (I.16) for  two stacked 
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reflector elements with a control rod hole and by Eq. (I.18) for two stacked fuel elements 
for coolant channels adjacent the inter-column gap. In both cases n=1. In the second case, 
(i.e. deformed block) the relation between flowrate and frictional pressure drop is given 
by Eq. (I.22) and n=0. In the second case however, the leakage terms will exhibit a 
dependence on the orientation of the wedge. Generally, the neutron gradient changes 
most predominantly in the radial direction resulting in the assemblies to bow in the radial 
direction. In this case, the gap will tend to open up in one of two directions, either 
radially outward or radially inward. Obviously, the exact case will bear on the form Eqs. 
(I.5) and (I.6) assume. 
 
F. Channel Coolant Axial Momentum Balance 
 
For the coolant channels in a block the momentum balance for the variables in the 
network diagram of Fig. 5 is 
 
1,1,,,, ||0 +− −−= klchannklchantklchanklchanklchan PwwKP    (I.7a) 
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and where Dh-chan is the diameter of the coolant channels in the block, Pw-chan is the wetted 
perimeter of all the coolant channels in the block, Achan the area of all the coolant 
channels in the block, and where 
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where nchan is the number of coolant holes per element and Dchan their diameter. When  
the multiple channel diameters exist, these last two equations are written as a sum of 
terms, one for each diameter. 
 
G. Control Rod Hole Coolant Node Mass Balance 
 
The control rod hole is situated in the interior of a block and runs its length. 
Coolant leaks into the hole from coolant holes that neighbor it. The leakage is assumed to 
occur through the interface between two stack blocks. Performing a mass balance on the 
flows into and out of this node shown in Fig. I.4 gives 
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where cntrl refers to the control rod hole and leak refers to the coolant leaking from the 
coolant channel into the control rod hole. klcntrlleakw
,
−
 is assumed positive when flow is 
from the coolant hole to the control rod hole.  Note that Fig. I.4 depicts the original unit 
network of Fig. 5.11 extended to include a control rod hole. 
 
Fig. I.4  Network Representation of Mass Nodes, Coolants Flowpaths, and Pressures for 
Elements with Control Rod Holes. Consists of unit network representation with added 
path for coolant flow in control rod hole. Only those variables associated with control rod 
hole are shown. Variables not shown are those associated with unit network. 
 
H. Block Interface Coolant Channel to Control Hole Coolant Momentum 
Balance 
 
A momentum balance between the coolant channels adjacent the control rod hole 
gives 
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where klcntrlleakK
,
−
is the loss coefficient. The loss coefficient is given by Eq. (I.18) with 
n=1 in the above equation.  
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I. Control Rod Hole Coolant Axial Momentum Balance 
 
For the control rod hole, the momentum balance for the variables in the network 
diagram of Fig. I.4 is 
 
1,1,,,, ||*0 +− −−= klcntrlnklcntrlklcntrlklcntrlklcntrl PwwKP    (I.10a) 
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Dcntrl = the diameter of the control rod hole in the block, and 
 
 Acntrl = the area of the control rod hole in the block. 
 
 
J. Outboard Gap Coolant Node Mass Balance 
 
The outboard gap is situated on the outermost side of the last block. Performing a 
mass balance on the flows into and out of this node gives 
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where the subscripts have the same meaning as previously. The superscripts are as before 
except ncol which refers to the last column and outbd refers to the outboard gap.  
 
K. Ouboard Gap Coolant Axial Momentum Balance 
 
A momentum balance between two vertically adjacent mass nodes in the outboard 
gap gives 
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where Agap-axoutbd,k and Pw-gap-axoutbd,k are the crossectional area and wetted perimeter, 
respectively, of the participating coolant.  
 
I.2 Constitutive Equations 
 
The relationship between mass flowrate and shear in the fluid near the wall of a 
channel is a key element in predicting the distribution of coolant. Expressions are 
developed for four geometries that appear in the core. 
 
A. Channel Flow 
 
A channel is a straight length enclosure through which coolant flows entering at 
an inlet and exiting at an outlet. A channel is taken to have a constant cross-sectional 
shape and area from inlet to outlet. In the GT-MHR, there are several flow paths that 
meet this description: the gap of rectangular cross section that extends axially between 
opposing faces of two blocks in adjacent columns, which we denote by chan; the gap of 
rectangular cross section that extends laterally between opposing faces of two blocks in 
adjacent columns, which we denote by gap; and the circular hole that extends axially the 
length of a block for insertion of a control rod, which we denote by cntrl. 
 
In a channel of arbitrary cross section, frictional pressure drop is obtained from 
circular tube experiment data using the concept of dimensional similitude. One obtains 
the expression  
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relating mass flowrate and pressure drop through the hydraulic diameter Dh defined as 
4*A/Pw where A is the crossectional flow area and Pw is the wetted perimeter and the 
friction factor 
 
nCf −= Re where  
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where C and n are constants and µ is viscosity. A loss coefficient is defined by collecting 
terms in the above two equations 
 
n
D
A
DA
CLK 





=
µ
ρ 22
        (I.13) 
 
so that  
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B. Leakage Between Parallel Disks 
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Reflector blocks are stacked vertically in columns creating an interface gap 
bewteen two stacked blocks. In the case of a reflector block with a control rod hole, there 
then is a leakage path between the interior hole and the inter-block gap at the exterior of 
the block through the interface gap. The flowrate through this gap is modeled assuming 
the following approximations. The reflector block is represented as a right-circular 
cyclinder having a radius of a circle with the same area as the hex face. The interior 
control rod hole is assumed to be centered in this circle. Then assuming the gap is small 
enough to produce laminar flow, [I.1] gives the flowrate as that between two parallel 
disks shown in Fig. I.5. 
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where δ is the gap thickness and υ is the kinematic viscosity with the remaining symbols 
defined in Fig. I.5. Rewriting the above equation in terms of a flow resistance K we have 
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Fig. I.5  Geometry for Leakage between Parallel Plates 
 
 
C. Leakage from Circular Channel Through Thin Gap 
 
In the case where blocks have not undergone deformation, the gap between two 
stacked blocks is small. It has been shown that approximately 98 percent of the coolant 
δ 
ri 
ro 
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leaking from coolant channels and escaping through the gap between the blocks 
originates in the outermost peripheral channels.[I.1] To model this, consider two flat-
faced blocks stacked one on top of the other and subject only to  the force of gravity. The 
two blocks meet at an interface whose gap thickness is a function of surface asperities 
and the contact pressure. In the case where the gap thickness is a few micrometers, the 
flow of gas in the gap is laminar and can be solved for analytically. Kaburaki [I.1] gives 
the following relation for coolant mass flowrate and pressure drop for a circular channel 
near  the periphery of these blocks as shown Fig. I.6. 
 
 
Fig. I.6  Geometry for Leakage from Circular Channel Through Thin Gap 
 
P
x
x
a
w
c
c
∆






+
−






⋅⋅−=
−
α
α
α
υ
δ
ln
2
tan
3
2
1
3
 
 
where xc is the location of the center of the coolant channel, a is the length of the side of 
the periphery of the block through which the coolant flows, α = (xc2 – rc2)1/2, rc is the 
radius of the coolant channel, δ is the gap thickness, and υ is kinematic viscosity. 
Rewriting the above equation in terms of a flow resistance K, we have 
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D. Leakage from Between Stacked Blocks Through Wedge-Shaped Gap 
 
In the case where blocks have deformed and where their position in the core is 
constrained by neighboring blocks or the vessel wall, a wedge-shaped opening develops 
between stacked blocks. The leakage from such wedged-shaped gap was measured 
experimentally by Groehn [I.2] for prismatic fueled blocks representative of those in the 
GT-MHR. The blocks each contained 72 coolant channels, had a flat-to-flat width of 0.36 
m, and a length of 0.8 m. In the experiments, the gap width was varied while the number 
of faces for which the gap was covered was varied from zero to five. The assumption is 
that the two blocks are in contact only along one of their six common edges. The nominal 
gap size is defined as the width of the gap on the opposite side of the blocks from where 
the two edges are contacting. Then in the experiment, if only this opening was left 
uncovered along the perimeter, the wedged-shaped gap is said to be covered along five 
faces (or along five-sixths of the block perimeter). If none of the openings along the faces 
were covered, then the gap is said to be uncovered along its entire perimeter (i.e five of 
the six faces have an opening). 
 
A correlation relating pressure drop to coolant velocity, gap size, and the number 
of faces covered is developed in [I.2] from experiment data. The  correlation is expressed 
in terms of an average velocity of the coolant in the gap defined as 
 
 KK uuu −= 0          (I.19) 
 
where uK  is the average velocity of the coolant in the upstream block and uK0 is the 
average velocity of the coolant in the downstream block. In the experiment uK0 > uK so 
flowrate was into the gap. The correlation is given as 
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where ρ is the coolant density, a is the nominal gap size, D is the coolant channel 
diameter, Agap is the uncovered area along the perimeter of the wedge shaped gap, and l is 
the length along an edge of a block. Note that if none of the gap is covered then Agap = 
3al in [I.2]. 
 
The above expression is rewritten in terms of gap mass flowrate. From Eq. (I.20) 
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where KB is a loss coefficient defined by 
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and w is the mass flowrate through the gap and A is the cross sectional flow area of the 
coolant channels in the block. 
 
I.3 Model Verification 
 
Verification is the process of determining whether a computational model 
correctly implements the mathematical model of the physical process. The flow 
distribution code developed in this project is programmed in Compaq Visual Fortran. Two 
separate verification tests were performed, each involving the Base Case problem 
described above.  The first test was performed to determine whether the programmed 
equations give a unique solution as they must if they have been correctly programmed. 
Uniqueness of solution is required on two levels. At the unit network level, Table I.1 
indicates that the mathematical equations for a unit network imply a solution and that it 
should be unique. At the global network level, Table I.2 indicates that the mathematical 
equations for the collection of unit networks also imply a solution and it should be 
unique. The code did in fact compute a unique solution. Its uniqueness was verified by 
examining the rank of the Jacobian of the linearized system equations in the 
neighborhood of the solution. Since the system is square, a full rank Jacobian would 
indicate the solution found is unique. The Jacobian rank was found to be full and so the 
solution is unique. 
 
The second verification test involved checking that the solution found by the 
Fortran code satisfies the equations that are to be solved, in this case Eqs. (I.1) through 
(I.12). These equations were programmed separately and independently in MATLAB. If 
the equations programmed in MATLAB are satisfied when the Fortran code solution is 
substituted in, then it is concluded the Fortran code has implemented the equations 
correctly. Note that the global solution to the flow allocation problem is composed of the 
simultaneous solution to each unit network. Thus, if the Fortran code solution when 
substituted into each of the unit networks as represented by the MATLAB program 
equations, then it can be concluded that the Fortran code correctly implements Eqs. (I.1) 
through (I.12). The hydraulic conditions represented by the converged Fortran code 
solution did in fact satisfy the MATLAB program equations indicating the equations in 
the Fortran code have been correctly programmed.  
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Table I.1  Uniqueness of Solution for Unit Flow Network: Inventory of Number of Variables, Equations, and Boundary Conditions 
                    # of Boundary Conditions      +                         # of Equations                                      =               # of Variables 
 
                                         6                                                               7                                                                            13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pgapl,k, Pchanl,k, Pgapl+1,k 
 
Pgapl,k+1 , Pchanl,k+1 
 
w
gap-lat
l-1,k
 
 
1 - channel coolant node mass balance 
        @ level k, Eq. (11) 
 
1 - gap coolant node mass balance 
        @ level k, Eq. (12) 
 
1 – gap coolant axial momentum balance 
        @ level k, Eq. (13) 
 
1 - gap coolant lateral momentum balance 
        @ level k, Eq. (14) 
 
2 – block interface coolant momentum balance 
         @ level k, Eqs. (15) and (16) 
 
1 – channel coolant axial momentum balance 
         @ level k, Eq. (17) 
 
 
 
 wgap-ax
l,k-1
, wchan
l,k-1 
 
wleak-in
l,k 
, 
 wleak-out
l,k
 ,
 wgap-lat
l,k 
 
wgap-ax
l,k 
, wchan
l,k 
, 
 
boundary condition variables 
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Table I.2 Uniqueness of Solution for Flow Network: Inventory of Number of Variables, Equations, and Boundary Conditions 
                        # of Boundary Conditions                  +                 # of Equations              =                     # of Variables a              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure at top of columns 
2*ncol  (i.e. Pgapl,1, Pchanl,1) 
1 (i.e. Pgapncol,1) 
 
pressure at bottom of columns 
2*ncol  (i.e. Pgapl,nlev+1 , Pchanl,nlev+1) 
1 (i.e. Pgapncol+1,nlev+1) 
 
lateral flow into inner face of first column 
0 b 
 
lateral flows at bottom of columns 
0 c 
unit network  
7*ncol*nlev  
 
mass balance in outboard gaps 
nlev 
 
pressure drop in outboard gaps 
 nlev  
 
flow into top of columns 
2*ncol (i.e. wgap-axl,0, wchanl,0) 
 
flow into top outboard gap 
1 (i.e. wgap-axncol+1,0) 
 
unit networks 
 7*ncol*nlev (i.e. Pgapl,k, Pchanl,k, 
wleak-in
l,k 
, 
 wleak-out
l,k
 ,
 wgap-lat
l,k
, 
wgap-ax
l,k 
, wchan
l,k) 
 
flow and pressure in outboard gaps 
nlev (i.e. wgap-axncol+1,k) 
nlev (i.e. Pgapncol+1,k) 
 
lateral flow into inner face of first column 
0 b 
 
pressure at bottom of columns 
2*ncol (i.e. Pgapl,nlev+1, Pchanl,nlev+1) 
 
pressure at bottom outboard gap 
1 (i.e. Pgapncol+1,nlev+1) 
 
lateral flows at bottom of columns 
0 c 
a  Unit cells are indexed l = 1,… ncol and k = 1, … nlev. For variables not in unit cells indices are l = 0, ncol+1 and k = 0, nlev+1. 
b
 Assume lateral flow develops only within interior of modeled columns. 
c
 Bottom unit cells serve soley to set core outlet boundary conditions; lateral flow assumed zero
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